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Abstract
Collective action for managing common pool resources is a vital element
with many appropriation and provision problems. Challenges of
ensuring collective action forces us to identify the determinants of
collective action. This study identifies what determines participation of
collective action for small scale irrigation farmers using canal irrigation
in Central Tigray. It also addresses determinants of intensity of collective
action participation given the farmers participate. The study uses
Multivariate probit regression to find the determinants of collective
action using a cross-sectional data from 240 observation. These
observation collected were from Dura, Laelay Logometi and Dibdebo
which are kebeles found in the Central Tigray Zone. This survey was
conducted in 2016 referring to 2007 E.C. The findings show that
determinants of collective action differ according to measurements of
collective action; but labour force in the household, income earned from
irrigation farming, membership in community organization, age of dam,
distance to all weather road and perception of rainfall adequacy affect
participation of an irrigation farmer in collective action positively.
Heckman sample selection was used to measure intensity of participation
in collective action resulting the different determinants to different
intensity measurements but age of dam affected intensity of participation
positively while size of irrigation dam had different sign with different
measurements of intensity. Hence policy makers should take into account
the determinants of collective action when designing irrigation projects.
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1.1 Background to the Study
Ethiopia, according to the World Bank has a projected population of 99.3 million with
a growth rate of 2.5% in 2015, making the country the second most populous country
in Africa (World Bank, 2015). The economy has had an agricultural sector which
accounted for 50.9% of the GDP, while the service and the industrial sector accounted
for 38% and 12.1% respectively around a decade ago but recently the service sector has
46.2% of GDP according to the report by (MoFED, 2013/14) while the agricultural and
manufacturing sector consisted 40.2% and 14.3% of GDP, respectively.
Economic growth of Ethiopia is exceptionally affected by the agricultural sector, which
rigorously depends on rainfall and also employs 85% of the population. Accelerating
this sector will improve agricultural output, increase farmer’s income and eliminate the
trend of hand to mouth feeding character of agricultural output by the population
(Hordofa, et al., 2008).
Ethiopian agriculture still uses rudimentary technology for food crops cultivation.
Cereals are the principal staple crops produced in bulk than other crops since they are
major food crops. Cereal accounted for 79.34% of the total grain crop production with
teff, maize, wheat and sorghum accounting for 22.6%, 17%, 11.89%, 15.92%,
respectively (CSA, 2011/2012).
However, the subsistence nature of agricultural production on the major food crops
produced being rain fed dependent will not produce the amount of food required by the
population hence expansion is inevitable. There needs to be an improvement in
production and productivity of food crops (Hordofa, et al., 2008).
Despite the unpredictability of distribution of rainfall, Ethiopia is endowed with
bountiful water resource. Which is the main component for irrigation. Irrigation
improves utilization of water resource for agricultural productivity and provides options
for crop diversification (IWMI, 2007). According to MoFED report Ethiopia has an
estimated potential of 5.1 million hectares land available for irrigation. (MoFED, 2010).
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Formal irrigation systems were introduced during the imperial regime with the purpose
of growing crops for sale like cotton, sugarcane, fruits and vegetables. Irrigation has
been exercised for nearly five decades, Modern methods of irrigation were introduced
in the 1960s (MCE 2004).
Irrigation is a system that is used to increase harvest since the imperial regime. In
Ethiopia, three types of irrigation systems have been practiced which are small, medium
and large scale irrigation schemes. Currently small scale irrigation schemes are given
priority over medium and large scale, but the previous regimes gave priority to large
scale irrigation scheme (Deribe, 2008).
A study conducted in irrigation water management needs solid policy to support small
scale irrigation and household water harvesting schemes to bring about job creations
for farmers, expansion in productivity of agriculture, improvement in welfare of
farmers and increasing availability, intake and access to food. Thus bringing a positive
spillover in the other sectors of the economy (Abedin, et al., 2006).
1.2 Statement of the problem
Ethiopia is a country where agricultural production is the backbone of economic
growth. Rain-fed agriculture dependency for output demands use of water management
technologies. This technologies are complementary to irrigation resulting productivity
enhancement. Irrigation complementary water management technologies involve soil
conservation practices and planting multiple trees (Ersado, 2005).
Agricultural water management technologies can be simply introduced in an area, but
the important thing to notice should be the use of that technology in appropriate ways.
These technologies help in maintaining the flow and supply of water for irrigation that
would make life easier for the agrarians facing water shortage problem in rain-fed
dependent counties like Ethiopia (UNCTAD, 2011).
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In allocation of water for irrigation purposes, collective action plays an important role
where members set rules for efficient distribution of water from common pool resource
i.e. water. The rule set must be in an impeccable balance from the contribution of local
participants and the providers or managers of the common pool resource that can be a
government or an irrigation association based on the type of irrigation system (Tang,
1991).
Common pool resource are resources accessed based on the geographical placement of
each beneficiary. Every user of the resource with an advantage due to placement will
gain/benefit greatly from the resource, imposing total loss of use by the other
beneficiaries. Collective action is compulsory for proper management in effective use
among users and to avoid exploitation (Ostrom & Gardner, 1993).
Common pool resources are usually subject to the problem of unequal distribution due
to appropriation and provision decisions. For example in an irrigation scheme
appropriation decisions determine the distribution of water among users which is
sequential. This scheme therefore reduces accessibility of water as we go along from
head enders to tail ender because upstream farmers might free-ride on the water
available due to their access to it first. Provision decisions determines the contribution
of beneficiaries to the flow of water. Hence based on the appropriation and provision
decisions communication among farmers will make it easier to reach an agreement in
cooperation that is vital in collective action for water management (Cárdenas, et al.,
2009).
Institutional setup was undermined to improve irrigation and agricultural output
because much emphasis is given to technological progress. External interventions can
hinder the mutual interdependence between farmers, though it is the mode of
introduction of technology in irrigation practice’s requiring costs for constant repairs
and labor for maintenance. Therefore, conflict might arise even in the improvement of
technology for the participants in irrigation systems without the proper institutional
format (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993). Institutional involvement in common pool
resources will improve collective action by providing funds to finance the running costs
for management (Uetake, 2015).
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Institutional arrangement has been unnoticed throughout the introduction of irrigation
systems In Ethiopia, more focus was given to the advancement in technology than
institutional factors and social capital. Social capital performs more adequately than the
formal rules and regulation because there is a sense of family and respect among
farmers because of social ties (Deribe, 2008).
This study would improve the knowledge gap for the institutional framework in
irrigation water management schemes adding the element of transportation cost, as
determinant. Inclusion a variable that represent institutions that are informal but also
characterize social ties is another addition. Earlier studies considered multiple ways of
irrigation (ground water irrigation, pump irrigation, well irrigation etc.) while emphasis
should be given to canal irrigation which embodies common pool resource more than
other types of irrigation. Collective action should be represented as a combination of
different activities that are correlated among one another. Combination of different
activities according to local water user association are used to manage canal irrigation.
Additional elements that represent farmer’s access to information were also taken into
consideration. These inputs will help to coin appropriate policy for irrigation schemes,
projects and also determinants of intensity of participation for farmers who participate
in collective action was considered as an objectives.
1.3 Objective of the study
This study attempts to provide evidence on the determinants of collective action and
household’s intensity for participating in collective action for irrigation water
management in a small scale irrigation schemes in central Tigray
The specific objectives of this study are:
 To identify the determinants of participation in the collective action and
intensity of participation in irrigation water management.
 To draw policy implications for improving collective action for irrigation water
management
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1.4 Significance of the Study
As outlined above in the introduction section, Ethiopia is rainfall dependent agricultural
farming based country. This implies that rainfall is seasonal and this rain needs to be
properly utilized for enhancing productivity. Because of irrigation water management
technologies, this problem seems to have a solution but this technologies demand
collective action by farmers. Institutions can boost the know-how in collective action if
correctly arranged leading to changes in the efficiency of agricultural production with
equitable distribution of water among users. This institutions can also be informal
showing social ties among farmers or formal which are extension contacts. Therefore,
this study will provide information to policy makers and planners during the design and
implementation of irrigation water management projects and programs.
1.5 Scope of the Study
This study is based on a cross-sectional data which was collected in the time period
from beginning of August to the end of October 2016 to analyse the determinants of
collective action for irrigation water management in small scale irrigation schemes
referring to the year 2007 E.C. These small scale irrigation schemes use canal irrigation.
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Chapter 2 Literature review
2.1 Common pool resources
Common pool resources are in a mix between perfect public goods and perfect private
goods with the characters of difficulty in exclusion from their public good nature and
subtractability from their private good nature, according to a definition given by Elinor
Ostrom (Ostrom & Gardner, 1993).
Common pool resources are not similar to private goods because of their character of
being owned communally making them closer to public goods than private goods.
Public goods are goods available in unlimited quantity indicating use of those goods
by an individual wouldn’t make the stock available to others any less but common pool
resources difference from public goods because they are available in a limited quantity
(Wade, 1987).
Often, in describing the common pool resources, we use examples to further explain
their exact characters. One of the common example can be international fresh water
fisheries which exhibit two important characters of partial excludability and rivalry.
Partial excludability can be further elaborated as the example given here. Let’s
consider an international fresh water. If extraction of fisheries is greater than their
biological regeneration it is excludable by an authority responsible in managing the
international fresh water, the element of partiality comes to those that doesn’t have
access to the resource due to geological setup. Rivalry among beneficiaries can be
explained as one beneficiary extracts the lesser availability to the others (Benvenisti,
1996).
2.2 Institutions and common pool resources
Institutions have existed since ancient times with change in human interaction because
they are constructed by the people to affect their behavior indicating they need to be
stable and change as the human behavior develops (North, 1990).
Traditional foundations and social norms are difficult to change with the introduction
of technology (new ways of doing things) implying changes in the institutional
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structure to take a long period of time. Changes within informal institutions being more
successful because it encompasses the foundations for a good institutional framework
(Williamson, 2000). Informal institutions are usually governed by rules that are
unwritten and commonly known by the participants that manage the common pool
resource. Acknowledging the importance of informal institutions as formal institutions
for management of common pool resources is mandatory (Nemarundwe & Kozanayi,
2003).
Institutional structure differ based upon the specific type of common pool resource.
There are two distinction of common pool resources, physical (humanly devised) and
biological. Both distinctions differ on their demand for institutional arrangement.
Uncertainty in the environment contribute to a higher demand for biological common
pool resource. For example fishery is biological CPR which requires appropriation
decisions that are complex to manage. Therefore, it demands a carefully well-
structured institutions compared to humanly devised common pool resource (Becker
& Ostrom, 1995).
(Ostrom, 1990) Classifies understanding between resource units and resource system
is vital to manage common pool resources. Resource systems are stock of the resource
accessible to be used by beneficiaries. Resource units are what beneficiaries use from
the resource system. For example resource system refers to irrigation canal while
resource unit refers to the water extracted from the irrigation canal. Appropriation and
provision decision are given emphasis because they are structure in managing CPRs.
Appropriation can’t be simultaneous from resource units but provision can. There can’t
be joint appropriation because the resource unit available for one beneficiary can’t be
available for another beneficiary but the resource system can be jointly used.
Provision decision are monitoring, protecting and maintaining continual sustenance of
resource systems. Provision and appropriation decisions are different, provision
decision are on the resource system while appropriation decision are on the resource
unit. This decision lead to the difficulty in managing CPRs. Resource units
subtractability creates appropriation problems, this includes free riding, uncertainty
and conflict among beneficiaries. These problems cause deterioration of provision
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hence beneficiaries must act jointly to eliminate appropriation problems and work
towards to strengthen the means of provision (Ostrom, 1990).
Operational rules are rules imposed on property right that are specified for common
property. This rules are imposed based on the resource type. According to (Tang, 1991)
this rules specify how the resource should be used, who is allowed to use it and what
equipment should be used in utilization. Operational rules are constructed by the
collective users making it prone to subjective changes by users. It is an informal right
not recognized by the government. Optimal management of common pool resources is
possible when governed by the combination of formal (governmental recognized) and
informal rules, because formal rules have the authority to be enforced by the institution
responsible i.e. governmental institution while informal rules are existing rules that has
a social foundation and traditional agreement among users. Their cooperation in
playing their role in obliging to informal rules in the community and formal rules of
the governmental institution makes management of common pool resources better
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992).
According to (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) right devised by institutions formal or
informal depends on 3 factors listed here. 1) Stability of institution when challenged
by a shock 2) the cost of enforcing the new rules and 3)condition that affect the
introduction of better property right regime according to resource.
Institutions determine the rules of the social interaction game in common pool
resources. Different institution setups exist affecting the decision making process in
common pool resources. Appropriate institutional setups have to be flexible and move
accordingly to the change in society henceforth adding cost element commonly
referred as transaction cost. Transaction costs are costs that exist due to lack of
information. Transaction cost are positive with an existence of an institution in the
short run requiring reduction in the long run. Introduction of contrasts and the existence
of law between interacting bodies are possible solutions (Brousseau & Glachant ,
2008).
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According to (Matthews, 1986) contracts are easy to change (reorganizing, rewriting)
between institutions where property rights, conventions and authorities are other part
of institutions which are hard to change overtime. Contracts are structured where both
parties weight in there possible options, hence problems will be encountered in
contracts if there is deception, where one could take advantage of the other due to
information asymmetry on the agreement outlined with the anticipation of higher
gains. The consequence will be enforced by the existing law requiring compensation
to the other involved party (Brousseau & Glachant, 2008).
There is a clear distinction between organization and institutions. Organizations are
the “players of the game” while institutions are “rules of the game”. This is a definition
given by Douglas North (North, 1990).
When organizations expand the extra transaction cost due to expansion increases until
it reaches the neutralizing point naturally financed by organizational expansion (Coase,
1937). Human behaviour is diverse for every choice and opportunity creating
inefficiencies because there exists cost of negotiation to reach an agreement with
information expansion (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).
External agency involvement seems to be necessary with a public good that has a
limited supply i.e common pool resources because control from exhaustion is
compulsory to guarantee collective action (Hardin, 1968). Local collective action with
accepted council would be much more efficient and cost effective rather than external
agency involvement because of social ties (Wade, 1987).
2.3 Common pool resources and equity
The most common problem in common pool resources is equal distribution among the
beneficiaries. The introduction of institutions formal or informal is essential element
with the resources that require proper care. Common pool resources are resources that
require appropriation and provision decision because utilization without a set of rules
and regulations that fix appropriation and provision problems will lead to conflict
among beneficiaries due to their finite nature (Wade, 1987). Existence of this
institution may yield an equitable distribution of resource. Informal institutions must
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typically be made up of the collection of beneficiaries, who work for individual gain
with combined action. The introduction of institutions has a paramount importance in
providing joint benefits among humans to ensure improve welfare (Dudu & Chumi,
2008). The solution of the equity problem in water management is questionable
without the involvement of institutions
Farmers in irrigation which are close to the starting point of water outflow commonly
known as upstream farmers should have proper verdict. Hence they are responsible
for equal sharing of the water among users (Campenhout, et al., 2012). This appears
to be unacceptable because upstream users are not benevolent in reality (Ulsido &
Alemu, 2014) A proper institution with strong influence on distribution, provision,
continual management and evaluation is perquisite for irrigation systems in water.
Bargaining is one of the methods that reduce the equity problems in the distribution of
water among upstream/ head end framers and downstream/tail end farmers by
reducing the difference in quantity of water allocated for downstream users.
2.3.1 Suggestions to improving equity of distribution
(Ostrom & Gardner,1993) formulated rotational rules to improve equity in water
distribution among upstream and downstream beneficiaries with two rotation rules ‘
Rotation rule A is based on the assumption that in odd number of years water first go
to tail enders and in even no of years water first reaches the head enders. Both enders
will work side by side for any days devoted to maintain the system.’ Rotation rule B is
based upon the same principles as A but the only difference is in years turn to days.
The involvement of bribing an official for water release was the main problem
irrigators faced. In their collaborations farmers use to hire officials for the distribution
of water with an agreement on equal distribution among their geological placement.
The officials responsible for distribution were bribed by the upstream farmers on the
actual distribution because they would not pay them if they reveal what happened to
the downstream farmers (Wade, 1982).
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Distribution among beneficiaries being equal is a very difficult objective to address.
Management must be as close to as possible to equal distribution. When talking about
common pool resources that must be available to every beneficiary when we consider
the issue of equity. Hence equity can only be maximized with collaboration and strong
social capital with the existence of local institutions being similar to appropriation and
provision rules (Ostrom, 1990).
2.4 Collective action in management of common pool resources
Collective action is harmonization of members on an objective or a set of objectives.
The main goal of collective action is to satisfy the common interest of members of the
group given the common pool resources (Wang, et al., 2012).
According to Robert wade “collective action is an action by more than one person
intended to achieve a common goal or satisfy a common interest (that is, a goal or
interest that cannot be obtained by an individual alone).Achievement means that a
public or collective goods has been provided” (Wade, 1987).
There are large scale and small scale collective actions with different approaches. It
was identified by (Uetake, 2015) that smaller collective actions operate where farmers
work together among themselves and those around them without any involvement of
any institution. He also identified the three others types of collective action as large
scale collective action that are organizational style (where every participant is a part of
an organization with rules and regulations), external agency led (every participant is
controlled by external agency), cooperation between external agency with farmers (the
combination of the above two).
According to Freeman (Freeman , 1990), in collective action for managing a common
pool resource cheating by one individual in cooperation with the assigned objective or
agree way to go in utilization of the resource will result in he/she enjoying larger share
of benefit compared to the users that abide the rules and regulations resulting in high
and continuous cost in management and monitoring of CPR.
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Inequality in wealth among beneficiaries can have two paradoxical effect on collective
action in management of common pool resources. First we will have rich participants
who do not worry as much as poor participants in the proper management of CPR.
Because the poor participants may be reliant on their livelihood compared to the rich
which will give them higher incentive to participate in collective action. Second the
richer participants might stimulate the poor participants to participate in collective
action because the wealthier participants acknowledge cooperation is essential for
higher welfare among the community with a consequence of poor participants taking
advantage by free raiding on use of CPR (Platteau & Baland, 1999).
2.5 Water allocation in irrigation systems
In irrigation system according to Freeman (Freeman, 1990), maintaining irrigation
systems is a difficult task with requirement of a long period of time and requirement
of high discipline from farmers with temptations to cheat on their water use.
Seasonal conditions decide the pricing of water in an irrigation. Cooler seasons or
times with larger amount of rainfall and small need of the water for an irrigation reduce
the demand for water in irrigation activities for crop production making the price lower
in this times. On the other hand in hotter seasons or times with smaller rainfall from
the environment the demand for water arises hence there are great need of supply of
water for irrigation farmers in production of crops (Appels, et al., 2004).
Water resource used in an irrigation scheme has a price which will depend on the
different pricing methods used by the providers. According to (Tsur & Dinar, 1995),
the pricing method that are listed below confirm that they can achieve efficiency. There
are three pricing methods. Volumetric pricing where farmers pay for the amount of
volume of water they used for irrigation, per unit area pricing where farmers pay a
fixed amount for each irrigated hectare, Output pricing where farmers pay for each
output unit.
2.6 Irrigation systems in Ethiopia
Based on the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) classification cited (IWMI,
2007), in Ethiopia private commercial farms changed hands to state ownership due to
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liberalization since 1990s. As a result the government has been engaged in expanding
the participation of farmers in irrigation schemes for better outcome in agricultural
production.
According to (IWMI, 2007), classification of irrigation schemes in Ethiopia is based
on size of the command area they occupy. The present irrigation schemes are large
scale, medium scale and small scale. If the command area occupied is greater than
3000 hectares we are referring to large scale irrigation scheme. Medium scale falls
within a range of 200 to 3000 hectares, whereas small scale irrigation schemes are
characterized by command area of below 200 hectares. The type of management
according to scale of the scheme is different whereby large scale scheme is managed
by state owned enterprises, medium scale managed by irrigation cooperatives and
small scale schemes are managed by local water user associations (Hagos et al,
2009).In 10 regions out of 11, 791 irrigation schemes exist in the country. The Amhara
region possess 310 schemes which is the highest number of schemes compared to the
others. Benishangul Gumz has 2 schemes (IWMI, 2007).
There are many challenges persisting that hinder development of irrigation in the
county. Among those lack of awareness in irrigation water management that leads to
insufficient community participation is the main one. Propriety are given by the
government in irrigation development through creating farmers training centers that
provides farmers with essential skills in irrigation (Haile & Kasa, 2015). One of the
compulsory skill is improvement of collective action among farmers.
Collective action for developing small scale irrigation schemes has paramount
importance with changing rainfall patterns and scarcity of irrigation water distribution
(Amede, 2015).
2.7.1 Empirical review on collective action for common pool resource
The method used in identifying the determinants of larger scale collective action in
agricultural natural resource was semi structured questionnaire. The group participants
and officers were from four case study areas of beaver hill initiative, agri-
environmental group planning in Saskatchewan, North Otago Irrigation Company and
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East coast forestry project. It was found out that three factors were there affecting large
scale collective action. To identify the issues of common pool resource based on
geological boundaries, support from governmental and non-governmental bodies
financially and through leadership and rules are important to manage the collective
system with monitoring and sanctioning, conflict resolution system and nested
government (Uetake, 2015).
Collective action determinants and its effectiveness in communal grazing land
management was the main objective of the study after collecting data from 100 villages
in northern highlands of Ethiopia. In this study by using five dependent variables where
a probit regression was ruined to determine whether communities pay for guard,
whether penalties were established and whether any violations occurred in 1988 which
is the reference period for the study, followed by Tobit regression on area of restricted
grazing land per household and contribution per household for grazing land
management. Since there was a censored survey data a Tobit regression was chosen
than probit. Variables that were considered to affect collective action are no of total
household in the village, restricted grazing promoted by external organization,
heterogeneity of oxen ownership of the community, total number of local organization
operating in the village, distant to market from the village, involvement of external
organization, whether cattle rearing was the second most important source of livelihood
and total area of the community (Gebremedhin, et al., 2004).
The results of the econometric analysis found out communities were more likely to
pay for guard at intermediate population than low or high population levels, violation
of use restriction are least likely to occur at intermediate population. The involvement
of external organization in promoting restricted grazing land areas reduced the
likelihood of communities paying for a guard whereas it has positive effect on
household contribution for grazing land management. Communities that are more
distant from markets are more likely to pay for a guard and to establish penalty system
for grazing land management. Whether or not cattle rearing was the second most
important source of livelihood in community did not affect any of the indicators of
collective action significantly. Heterogeneity in oxen ownership tends to diminish
collective action. Heterogeneity increases the likelihood of violations of restrictions
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and regulations. Heterogeneity explained household contribution for grazing land
management negatively but was statically insignificant. It was also found out total
area of the community has positive effect on area of restricted grazing land per
household (ibid).
Exploration of how resource characteristics and the institutional context affect
people’s behaviuor in common pool resource considering mangrove and the cockle
fishery was the main objective of the research. By constricting a semi-structured
questionnaire to obtain qualitative and quantitative data for creating measures of
collective action. 12,433 samples were collected from Muisne, Las Manchas, Puerto
Hualtaco, Isla Costa Rica from beginning of 2009 to end of 2010.OLS regression was
used to measure response variable MEANTUB(mean shell length in each fishers
catch) with explanatory variables members of association, age of fisher, size of the
community, lunar cycle (spring tides), fixed effect to control for unobserved
geographical heterogeneity, no of cockles used for Mari culture and trust that other
users comply with rules in use (Beitl, 2014).
It was found out that size of community, lunar cycle(spring tide), fixed effect to
control for unobserved heterogeneity and number of cockle used for Mari culture were
statistically significant affecting the explanatory variable MEANTUB negatively,
positively, negatively, negatively respectively with all other variables being
insignificant. The independent cockle collectors because of trust and not being invited
in the reforestation program do not contribute to collective action. At the same time
they were criticized as a free raiders on the hard work of the collective effort by their
lack awareness or customary rules in fishing (ibid).
Using a cross sectional survey of members and non-members of farmers group to
determine and assess impact of collective action of framers in Kenya, 444 respondents
were selected using stratified random sampling. 137 were non-members, 201 group
members and an additional 106 farmers were included to have a more robust control
group. Binary choice probit regression model was used where the response variable
was to investigate farmers choice whether to join the group with explanatory variables
size of the land holding, size of the land holding squared, property title for land, lagged
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size of banana plantation, lagged area squared, log of value of agricultural equipment,
household owns donkey cart, household owns car, pick-up or motorbike, no. of cattle
owned by household, age of household head in years, age of household head in years
squared, head has primary education or above, female headed household, number of
household members, household owns mobile phone, household participates in other
groups, household has access to credit, distance to nearest paved road in km, distance
to nearest paved road in km squared, household member has nonfarm employment and
household member has nonfarm self-employment. To generate the effects of group
membership is modeled in two stages, stage one propensity score matching from probit
model. Stage two calculation of the ATT (average treatment effect on the treated) using
matched observation of members and non-members (Qaim & Fischer, 2012).
It was found out the size of land holdings has a positive and significant effect
increasing the predicted probability of membership by 4.3 % points with as additional
acre of land owned. The predicted probability of membership is decreased by 0.2 %
points by size of land holdings squared. The log value of agricultural equipment has a
positive and significant effect. Age of household in years, household owns a mobile
phone, access to credit, distance to near paved road and self-employment were found
to be significant affecting probability of membership positively. However distance to
near paved road squared did negatively. The outlined points were results of the
restricted sample which makes it different from the full sample because it doesn’t
include the control group regions. Meanwhile in full sample analysis which was
estimated to calculate individuals propensity scores, few of the results changed. All the
listed variables above were significant except agricultural equipment and age of house
hold in years. The ATT calculated resulted shows four results. Forty percent of the
members didn’t participate in collective marketing rather individual marketing,
marketing through the group yields higher price than individuals, no change in harvest
for the group members who market through the group, and a significant decrease in
harvest for members who market Individuals, for collective marketers of banana total
income from banana has a significant increase resulting in improvement in welfare for
collective marketers. While this doesn’t appear for individual marketers (ibid).
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The Robustness of estimated ATTs in the probit model was tested. The ATT results
for members marketing collectively from the base model and two variations. First
variation is reduced probit model which excludes no of cattle’s owned, value of
agriculture equipment, means of transportation and mobile phone ownership. Second
variation uses extended model which includes risk attitudes, cash crop production,
dummy measuring the efficiency of banana supply chain in sub-location, ownership of
irrigation equipment’s in five years. It was found out that signs of ATT are mostly
unchanged although significance level varies. For example total banana income is
significantly different between members and non-members through the three models
even though total annual income was only significant for the base and reduced probit
models (ibid).
A study was conducted in Tigray about collective action in 1998/99, on a survey taken
from 50 tabias using stratified random sampling. The first objective was to evaluate
the nature and impact of community management in the regeneration of woodlots in
Tigray. Second objective was to assess the determinants of collective action and its
effectiveness in managing community woodlots. Collective action was considered to
be affected by factors like population density, agricultural potential, market access
involvement of external organization, village level management and size of resource.
Tobit regression model was used to explain collective labour investment and survival
rate. Binary probit choice model was used to explain whether the community pays
for the guard or whether there were violations of restrictions. Furthermore OLS
regression was used to measure tree planting density (Gebremedhin, et al., 2003).
The findings were labour intensity of woodlots management  is positively
associated with population density with parallel increase in both variables at first and
when the population density reaches its maximum there will be negative relationship
that follows from then on. The community pays for a guard, violations of restrictions
and survival rate of trees also show the same relationship as the above one and are
statically insignificant while planting density and population density were significant.
Market access with more remote communities provide greater collective labour
input, densely planting trees and obtaining higher survival rates. The presence of
external organization as indicated by whether the woodlots was promoted by external
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organization has a negative association whether the community pays for the guard
and with tree survival. Unexpectedly collective action was more effective on tabia
managed woodlots than village managed woodlots. Lastly, area of woodlots had a
statically insignificant relationship impact on measurement of collective management
and effectiveness of woodlots (ibid).
Participating in collective market in the study by (Qaim & Fischer, 2012) is a choice.
It only depends on participation and not participation in collective marketing. When it
comes collective action participation in common pool resources there are numerous
factors that should be considered according to the type of CPRs. The study by
(Gebremedhin, et al., 2003) and (Gebremedhin, et al., 2004) considered activities that
represent collective action but didn’t consider correlation among those activities. The
study by (Uetake, 2015) gives us qualitative explanations which are very important but
could be supplemented by quantitative analysis while quantitative analysis on large
scale collective action could be difficult.
2.7.2 Empirical review on collective action for irrigation water
management
A study was conducted in South Africa after collecting cross sectional data from 307
respondents where 246 were scheme members and 61 non-members in Mooi River
Irrigation Scheme. The main objective was to know what factors determine
participation and intensity of farmers in collective action for irrigation water
management in a small scale irrigation scheme. Using principal component analysis
for summarizing few factors that capture the maximum possible variations among the
listed dependent variables, a linear combination of variables were derived from the
original dependent variables. Then Tobit regression was used to measure the
determinants of participation and an ordered probit regression to measure individual
intensity of participation in irrigation water management. It was found out that farmers
who obtained high income from the irrigation activates participate more than their
counterparts and farmers who received irrigation training participated more. Other
important variable were farmers with larger land coverage who have a positive relation
to participation maybe due to their request of water to cultivate their land compared to
the farmers with smaller land (Muchara, et al., 2014).
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Intensity was highly determined by the modality of water supply the farmers receive,
agrarians that used pumps incurred more cost than that of gravity based making
them less intensive. Another important variable was the education level of a farmer
which was found to be positively related to intensity and engaging in the local water
user associations for development of collective action. All the explanatory variables in
the study showed results that is expected. Assessing the objectives with same modality
of water distribution may shade different light on beneficiaries’ reaction to collective
action. (ibid).
With an objective of assessing factors that influence the likelihood of collective action
among large and different groups of irrigation systems, OLS regression was used to
estimate the effects of water scarcity proxied by crop intensity, distance to market, age
of irrigation associations, group size, origin of irrigation activity, average size of
irrigation farm, gender (proportion of women in irrigation activity) and government
(governance structure of irrigation activity) on monetary free riding. Logit regression
model coded 0 if at least 75% of irrigation association members contribute labour
voluntarily based on the attendance records of association and 1 otherwise was the
second proxy measure in free riding in labour contribution with the same explanatory
variables. 1958 observations were considers from 196 large scale public irrigation
system with an assembled multivariate cross sectional data set. Crop intensity, group
size, farm size, government structure were found to be statically significant at 5% of
level of significance while all other variables were insignificant except access to
market which was statically significant at 10% level of significance on the likelihood
of free raiding in irrigation setting. In the logit model only age of the irrigation activity
and distance to market were found to be statically significant (Araral, 2009) .
(Gulati, et al., 2002) undertook a study using separate key informant interview and
semi-structured interview taking nine randomly selected sites and three purposively
selected sites in two irrigation systems. To assess collective action for managing
resources in Indian states of Rajasthan and Karnataka, logistic regression model was
used in two stages. First stage analyzes the likelihood of some form of water user’s
organization as a function of water supply, size of water association, social
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heterogeneity, access to market, external organization and leadership. Second stage
examines likelihood of collective maintenance as a function of (predicted)
organizations and other factors.  Dummy variables for irrigation systems that are four
(IGNP, CHAMBAL, KRS, UKP), dummy variables for head and tail which proxies
water scarcity, size of hydrological unit, distance to market, social capital of the minors
command indicated by the presence of cooperatives and temples in the minor
command final variable was leadership potentials indicated by no of college graduates
and dummy variable for influential person was used to determine probability of
farmers irrigation organization.
In the first stage logic regression, it was found out coefficients for system dummy
variables were significant while the head or tail variables were not significant.  Access
to market had a significant but negative effect. The number of temples in the village of
the command area does have a significant and positive influence on likelihood of
organization for irrigation while the cooperatives in the command minor area was not
significant. Among leadership variables both the presence of college graduate and
influential person have a significant positive effect on irrigation organization. In the
second stage logic regression the model of collective action included predicated value
of whether there would be a water user association (WUAp). All the variables were
found to be insignificant except two variables the predicated value if irrigation
organization (WUAp) which has a positive effect and villages which was the indicator
of social size and social heterogeneity. Most important variables considered were
insignificant (ibid).
For a transitional economy in the Bulgarian irrigation sector identifying constraints of
collective action was the aim of the study. Qualitative research method being
predominant than quantitative analysis 17 villages were used for the case study.
Selection of farmers by random sampling for an interview to authenticate key person’s
interview and information of expert’s interview results. Participative observation
combined with qualitative interview was used resulting a triangulation of data from
multiple sources to do the analysis. In the 2nd phase a standardized questionnaire was
conducted where 2/3 were open ended questions by interview guideline. In 3rd phase
finding from 2nd phase where incorporated for another phase standardized
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questionnaire. The finding of the study was that deteriorating of social capital by
specific actors with characteristics that constrain the possibilities of collective action.
Social capital is key component in collective action for common pool resources in the
long term. Institutional management preferably state institution of irrigation sector
with high participation from farmers was medium term solution (Theesfeld, 2004).
To realize what kind of institutional arrangement is required for water resource a case
study was conducted in southern Zimbabwe in a district called Chive. Key informant
interview, participation observation and participation rural appraisal was the
methodologies used to address the objective. Privately owned and community owned
water sources were under the study. Common pool resource management was assisted
by social capital was a key finding. This social capital were structured in an
uncommon way i.e. rules and regulations were unwritten but known by the governing
bodies and the beneficiaries. Unwritten rules endorsed social capital implicating the
bond found by beneficiaries were much greater community built institutions.
(Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003).
To find out the determinants of collective action and effectiveness in irrigation water
management in Astbi wemberta (Tigray) and Ada’a (Oromiya region) data was
collected from 169 groups. To measure collective action four univariate probit
selection model and one OLS regression was used. The results show average value of
a group member contribution for the resource management run by OLS regression and
if there are guards protecting the irrigation site modelled by a probit selection were
affected by mainly group and scheme level variables. Whether a group of members
contribute for guards and if there is a water distribution in the irrigation scheme were
affected by group level variables, farm level variables, village level variables and
scheme level variables while whether group members contribute for the water
distributer was affected by farm level and village level variables. Failure of collective
action dependant variables were modelled by OLS and Tobit decomposition.
Frequency of violation occurrence modelled by OLS was affected by group level
variables, farm level variables and village level variables. Number of conflicts
occurred modelled by tobit was affected by mainly group level variables and village
level variables, scheme level variables. Effectiveness of collective action represented
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as number of penalty system exercised was modelled by a tobit where scheme level
variables and village level variables affected it (Deribe, 2008).
The study by (Muchara, et al., 2014) used PCA to capture the variation in dependent
variables would not show what determines each dependent variables separately. Cost
and access to information capturing variables inclusion would have given better
results. The studies by (Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003) and (Theesfeld, 2004)
showed the dominant value of social capital using qualitative analysis. The study by
(Gulati, et al., 2002) considered position of block made the analysis better even if they
were insignificant assess factors that affect collective action management. This
research uses a larger observations that produced similar results with literature (Araral,
2009). Collective action should be modeled with available dependent variables that
represent it. It should be acknowledged this measurements are correlated. Participation
in one activity affects participation another activity. The study by (Deribe, 2008) didn’t
consider this assumption.
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Chapter 3 Source of data and methodology
3.1. Formulations of the questionnaire
Before going to the study site, developing a household level questionnaire that
accurately captures details required for the study was crucial. The questionnaire was
tested to make sure it is appropriate for this study and to see the reactions of
respondents. A pre-test was conducted in Mekki irrigation scheme where male headed
and female headed households were involved in the pre-testing. It was found out the
questionnaire was easy to understand needing only certain modifications.
Modification on some of the questions was necessary to capture an accurate data on all
the variables that are outlined to measure determinants of participation and intensity of
collective action. Recalling some of the questions included were difficult for the
respondents hence answers were not available. The pre-test was a good experience and
helped to improve the quality of questionnaire and made questions easy to understand
and give accurate responses.
3.2 Description of the study areas
Dura, Dibdebo and Laelay Logometi are kebeles of the study found in Central Tigray
zone, in the northern part of Ethiopia. Dura is located in wereda called Semen Maychew
which is 10 km from the city of Axum on the way to Shire. Axum is a city that is 942
km away from Addis Ababa. Laelay Logometi is located in a wereda called Adwa
which is 30 km away from the city of Adwa on the way to Tembain. Dibdebo is located
in a wereda called Aferom which is 28 km away from the city of Adwa on the way to
Adigrat. Adwa is 927 km away from Addis Ababa. The farmers in the study areas
practice mixed farming system. They grow crops and rear livestock as their main source
of livelihood. The farmers in the study sites use irrigation plots as well as rainfed plot
to produce crops.













14° 17' 97.43'' 14° 09' 02.23'' 39° 02' 52.67'' 38° 96' 82.31''
Dibdebo 14° 27' 69.32'' 14° 26' 21.55'' 39° 09’ 28.96'' 39° 07' 61.78''
Figure 3.2 Map of study kebeles in Central Tigray, Ethiopia.
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Firstly, the sample population collection is based on irrigation farmers who use only
dam as their source of water distributed by means of gravity to their farm.  Other types
of irrigation systems like pumping of water from wells and any other water source and
diversions were left out. Three study sites were found using canal irrigation. By
implementing multistage sampling on a set, identification of the irrigation farmers from
non-irrigation farmers was made from three kebeles that used canal irrigation. It was
found out that Dura, Dibdebo and Laelay Logometi have 193,632 and 268 farmers who
are engaged in irrigation farming from canal irrigation using gravity. The development
agents information on farmers having many plots of land that is located in multiple of
the stratas was wrong for this study hence there should be another stage where farmers
who are included must be found only in one strata was vital for selection of sample
population. The stratas are head ender, mid ender and tail ender.
By carefully working with the development agents to select the farmers based on the
stratas, farmers having irrigation plots in two strata were eliminated. Because they are
not representative of a single strata, elimination of these group is to avoid biased
participation of an individual farmer based on the different locations of irrigation farms
resulting an average outcome. Dura had 153 framers who qualified for the selection
criteria set to be a sample population. The sample population of Dibdebo and Laelay
Logometi is 165 and 180 irrigation farmers respectively.
Selecting the 240 observations from four kebeles1 was the original plan in the proposal
but after visiting the sites we selected two of the kebeles who use water pumping from
wells for their irrigation farms. This kebele’s had to be excluded because they can’t be
integrated in the three stratas. Dibdebo was then selected as a replacement for the
kebele’s excluded. To make sure the data is as much representative as possible 80
households from ever kebeles were taken as samples.
When selecting the samples according to stratified random sampling, the sample
a strata of three categories that represent their location (position of block) of the
__________________________
1
Kebele is the smallest local level administrative unit
26
household’s farm where the distance from the starting point of the dam is categorized
as head, the next to it is mid and the last to receive the water were the tail farmers.
Classification of the location according to their position of block was made in
consulting development agents of each site.
Separation of samples form population sample was made by putting all the observations
in the population sample in alphabetical order and selecting 80 representative samples
from each site conferring to their actual proportion of placement. Selection of three
enumerators from every site with one supervisor took place. The supervisor working
together with development agents made choice of enumerators based on their
experience in data collection, education and their understanding of the survey. Selected
enumerators were given a one day training particularly on understanding the questions
fully in order to explain it clearly to respondents before starting the survey. They all
conducted pretest to check if problems existed in collecting the data, and learned how
to make questions unbiased and non-leading.
The survey was completed with full success were the assumption of farmers doing
repairs for Canal in 2007 couldn’t be measured hence there was no repairs done in
Dibdebo and Laelay Logometi reducing the participation measuring variables from four
to three. Selection of the year (2007) where cross-sectional data was collected couldn’t
be changed because accuracy of respondent’s would deteriorate.
3.3 Descriptive analysis
Descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables for the data is show
in the table below.
Table 3.3 Description of variables
Explained Variables
Measurement of Participation Proportion of
yes
Yes
Did you clean dams in 2007? .8417 202
Did you contribute funds for irrigation activities in 2007? .8583 205
Did you attend meetings by WUA in 2007? .8958 215
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Explanatory Variables Mean Min Max
Age of household head in years 54.36 25 90
Sex of household head (male=1, female=0) 0.704 0 1
Labour force 3.104 0 8
Education of household head 2.53 0 12
Annual income of household head from irrigation 3258.08 0 46000
Ownership of mobile phone by household head? .4625 0 1
Ownership of Television by household head .1167 0 1
Ownership of Radio by household head .171 0 1
Size of irrigation farm in hectare .11855 0.15 0.786
Size of rainfed farm in hectare .11447 0 0.625
Distance to input  market from homestead in minutes 17.8167 0 120
Distance to all weather road from homestead in minutes 30.40417 1 180
Distance to Crop selling market from homestead in minutes 79.542 0 270
Extension contact in irrigation farming 0.3 0 1
Extension contact in rainfed farming 0.29 0 1
Membership in community based organization 0.5292 0 1
Age of dam 12.3875 3 18
Perception of rainfall adequacy 0.4167 0 1
Position of block Head Mid Tail
95 67 78
Source: Survey 2016
3.3.1 Descriptive analysis of explained variables for Kebeles
After going to the sites it was found out that there was no repairs done in Dibdebo and
Laelay Logometi for the study period (2007). This reduces the explained variables to
three.
Dura had repairs done in 2007 and all the other explained variables are listed below.
Table 3.3.1.1 Dependent variables for Dura
Measurement of participation Yes No
Did you clean dams in 2007? 80 0
Did you repair dams in 2007? 80 0
Did you contribute funds for irrigation
activities in 2007?
80 0
Did you attend meetings by WUA in 2007? 80 0
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Source: Survey 2016
Laelay Logometi had no repairs done in 2007. The data is as follows
Table 3.3.1.2 Dependent variables for Laelay Logometi
Measurement of participation Yes No
Did you clean dams in 2007? 64 16
Did you contribute funds for irrigation
activities in 2007?
66 14
Did you attend meetings by WUA in 2007? 64 16
Source: Survey 2016
Dibdebo had no repairs done in 2007 the data is as follows
Table 3.3.1.3 Dependent variables for Dibdebo
Measurement of participation Yes No
Did you clean dams in 2007? 58 22
Did you contribute funds for irrigation
activities in 2007?
59 21
Did you attend meetings by WUA in 2007? 71 9
Source: Survey 2016
3.3.2 Descriptive analysis of explanatory variables
3.3.2.1 Household level variables
Sex: - The cross-section data collected show 70% male and 30% female respondents
across all the three sites. Where Dura had 77.5% male and 22.5% female respondents,
Laelay Logometi had 76.25% male and 23.75% female and Dibdebo had 57.50% male
and 42.50% female respondents as sample population.
Age: - The mean age of household head for the study sites was 54. The highest
percentage of age concentrated for household head was at 50. 84% of the respondents
in the study sites were in between the age of 40 to 80 showing experience in farming.
The mean age for Dura respondents was found to be 54, the mean age for Laelay
Logometi household head was 49 and Dibdebo household heads have mean age of 59.
This data from each Kebele shows that all of the household heads who are responsible
in making all of the major decisions are middle age adults. 74% of household heads in
Dibdebo are between the age group 40 to 70. 71% of household heads in Dura are
between the ages of 38 to 62. 74% of the household heads in Laelay Logometi are
between the ages of 35 to 63. All of the study sites household heads are in classified as
adults.
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Labour force: - The mean labour force available in a households across all sites was
3.1. The mean labour force for Dibdebo was 2.66 being the least of the three whereas
Laelay Logometi and Dura had a labour force available 3.1 and 3.57 for households
selected to be respondents. This indicates the labour force available within the
household could have two effects on participation. If the dependents who are under the
age of  15 are in a higher proportion compared to the labour force the bigger the family
the lower tendency for participation. This can be explained as there is a need for hired
labour which increases cost of irrigation farming. On the other hand. if things are
reversed to what is outlined above the tendency for participation will be higher with
family member’s participation for irrigation and helping out with certain tasks. 31.25%
of the sample population has equal number of family size and active labour force
(between the ages of 15-64) whereas the 68.75% of the households have a greater
family size than active labour force.
Education: - 52.8% of the respondents are illiterate with education only in writing and
reading the local language. Whereas 47.2% of the respondents which are the other half
who took only primary school education.10.83% of households were educated up to
fourth grade. 61.25% of households in Dura only received education in writing and
reading of the local language. 1.25% of the respondents from Dura received secondary
school education.33% of households in Laelay Logometi have education in writing and
reading of the local language.10% of households in Laelay Logometi have secondary
school education while the rest had a primary school education. 97.5% of the
households in Dibdebo have primary school education while the remaining 2.5% had
secondary school education. Dibdebo has farmers better educated relative to the other
kebeles showing education is a key determinate. Dura and Laelay Logometi have
relatively younger household heads with higher social ties due to size of irrigation farm
in their PA(peasant association) compared to Dibdebo
Income from irrigation: -The mean annual income from irrigation for all the study
sites was found to be ETB 3258. 68.75% of the respondents from all the study sites
have an income range of ETB 1,000-46,000. The mean annual income for respondents
is ETB Dura 5772. 86.25% of the respondents earn income in a range ETB 2,000-
24,000. The mean annual income for respondents in Laelay Logometi was ETB 2125
birr.75% of the respondents in Laelay Logometi earn an income from irrigation in the
range ETB 1,000- 18,000. The mean annual income for respondents in Dibdebo was
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ETB 1876. 33.75% of the respondents in Dibdebo earn an income from irrigation in the
range of ETB 1,000- 46,000. This show Dura earns more income for irrigation with a
lower highest income compared to respondent in Dibdebo.
Ownership of Mobile Phone: - 46.25% of the household heads from all of the study
areas own mobile phone. This is less than half of the sample population so there should
be another source of information obtaining device should be included in this study as
variables. Ownership of television and radio were then included in the analysis to
capture access to information. Dura with the lowest ownership of mobile phone shows
13.75% of the respondents own mobile phone. Half of respondents in Laelay Logometi
own mobile phone while 75% of the household head in Dibdebo own mobile phone.
Ownership of Television: - Only 11.67% of the sample population own television.
Households in Laelay Logometi have the lowest ownership of television among the
three sites with 3.75% ownership and Dura follows with 6.25%. While 25% of the
respondents in Dibdebo own Television.
Ownership of Radio: - Only 17.1% of the sample population owns radio. Households
in Laelay Logometi have the lowest ownership of radio among the three sites with
11.25% ownership and Dura follows with 16.25%. While 23.75% of the respondents in
Dibdebo own radio.
3.3.2.2 Farm level variables
Size of irrigation farm: - The biggest irrigation farm owned by a respondent is 0.78
hectare in three study areas. A way of measuring land in the area is known as Timad.
25% of the respondents own land more than 1 timad (1 hectar is 0.25 timad). The mean
size of irrigation farm in Dura is the highest among the 3 sites with 0.207 hectar.
Following Dura comes Laelay Logometi with mean size of irrigation farm 0.09
hectares. Dibdebo has the lowest mean irrigation farm size of 0.054 hectares.
Size of rainfed farm: - The biggest rainfed farm owned by a respondent is 0.625
hectare in three study areas. 30.83% of the respondents own land more than 1 timad.
The mean size of rainfed farm in Dura is the highest among the 3 sites with 0.20707
hectar. Following Dura comes Dibdebo with mean size of irrigation farm 1.1577
hectares. Laelay Logometi has the lowest mean irrigation farm size of 0.11135 hectares.
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3.3.2.3 Infrastructure level variables
Distance to all weather road from homestead in walking minutes: - For the three
sites the longest distance a respondent has to travel is 180 minutes with the shortest
being one minute. 50% of the respondents in Dura takes them from 10 to 90 minutes to
travel to all weather road. 75% of the respondents in Laelay Logometi takes them from
40 to 180 minutes to travel to all weather road. Dibdebo has the shortest distance. For
respondents (87.5%) to reach all weather road they walk less than 10 minutes.
Distance to input market from homestead in walking minutes: - The longest walk
for 3 of the respondent across all the study site was 120 minutes with one minute being
the shortest for getting to the input market. Dura which has the closest distance of input
market, 96.25% of the respondents have to travel from 10 to 50 minutes to reach the
input market. Dibdebo comes next with 48.75% of its respondents taking 10 to 25
minutes to reach the input market. However the three respondents who took 120
minutes to reach input market are in Dibdebo. 77.5% of the respondents in Laelay
Logometi took from 10 to 60 minutes to travel to input market in the kebele.
Distance to crop selling market from homestead in walking minutes: - In the study
sites every farmer sold his/her crops produced to their closet market which is market in
tabia. 50% of the respondents had to travel from 95 to 270 minutes to sell their crops.
86.5% of the respondents in Laelay Logometi had to travel from 30 to 270 minutes to
sell their crops, this site has the furthest crop selling market across the three. Dura
comes next with 75% of the respondents had to travel from 90 to 160 minutes to reach
the crop market. Dibdebo has the closet crop market with 95% of the respondents had
to travel from 5 to 120 minutes.
3.3.2.4 Institutional level variables
Whether the household has access to credit: - All of the respondents across in the
study sites have access to credit.
Extension contact in irrigation farming: - Trainings programs are given to
respondents every year by development agents in farmers training center. These
trainings are considered as a key variable as extension contact in irrigation. 30% of the
respondents have taken irrigation training from all the sites. Dura come first with 70%
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of its respondents taking this trainings. Laelay Logometi and Dibdebo respondents have
a very low attendance of irrigation farming training with 11.25% and 5% respectively.
Extension contact in rainfed farming: - The same kind of trainings but on rainfed
farm plots. Row cultivation, use of selected seeds and proper and timely use of
fertilizers are trainings given in rainfed farming. 29% of the respondents have taken
rainfed farming training from all the sites. Just like irrigation attendance by respondents
Dura comes first with 73.75% of the respondents participating. Dibdebo and Laelay
Logometi have the same low attendance as above with 8.75% and 5% attendance
among respondents respectively.
Whether a farmer is a member of community based organization: - According to
theory and intuition social ties would be much greater when irrigation farmers belong
to community based organization since their interaction overall will be greater. 52.92%
of the respondents do have a membership in community based organization across all
sites. All the respondents in Dura are a member of an external organization.  Dibdebo
has 33.75% of its respondents being a member in such organizations. With a low 25%
Laelay Logometi becomes the last one with a few respondents being a member.
3.3.2.5 Scheme level variables
Whether the rainfall is adequate for the irrigation farmer (his or her perception):
- In all the study sites 41.67% of the respondents acknowledged according their
perception the rainfall of 2007 was adequate for the farm plots. 60% of Dura
respondents and 53.75% of Laelay Logometi respondents thought that it was adequate.
Dibdebo has the lowest with 11.25% of the respondents perceiving the rainfall as
adequate.
Age of dam: - the dam in Laelay Logometi is the newest among all with only 3 years.
Second comes the dam in Dibdebo that is 16 years old. The oldest id Dura with 18
years. Age of dam shows growth of farmers with improved use of water from the dam.
Dummy variable for position of block: - This variable represents the three strata’s
where the respondents were selected from. According to their position of block and the
actual proportion of irrigation farms. In Dura 40% of the respondents were taken from
the tail end, 35% of the respondents were taken from mid end and the remaining 25%
from head end. In Laelay Logometi with equal 40% settlement of head and tail ender
farmers the remaining 20% of the respondents were from the mid ending position.
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Dibdebo has a 23% and 22% tail and mid enders respectively with the majority 55% of
head ender respondents.
3.3.3 Credit market for the study sites
The water user association in Dura has another branch of organization that is called
“Equar” which sole purpose is to provide credit to the farmers based on their needs and
their ability to pay for the credit according to the contract type. The credit will be given
to farmers based on the purpose it will serve. If the farmer is discovered using the credit
for another purpose than what it was borrowed for originally, the farmer will be warned
following a lower credibility of the farmer for next loan.
Credit associations formed by the woreda is present at Laelay Logometi which offers
loan for all the farmers in the area. This credit to farmers with payment based on the
purpose credit granted for will last for a two years.
Dibdebo has Dedebit Microfinance and saving which offers credit services in the area
when the farmers save a certain amount of money for a month in the institution. This
credit to farmers with payment contract based on the purpose credit will last from two
up to five years.
Even if access to credit was one of the explanatory variables in the model it has to be
dropped because every farmer has access to credit
3.3.4 Major crops and vegetables produced on irrigation land
The major crops, vegetables and fruits produced by the selected irrigation farmers in
Dura are listed in the table below















The major crops, vegetables and fruits produced by the selected irrigation farmers in
Laelay Logometi is listed in the table below.







The major crops, vegetables and fruits produced by the selected irrigation farmers in
Dibdebo is listed in the table below.











3.4 Empirical methods of data analysis
Cross sectional data was collected by using multistage sampling, where in the first stage
the scheme members and non-members were separated. Followed by second stage
where stratified random sampling was used to select 240 observations within the
irrigation scheme taking into account their position of block (head, mid, tail).
Econometric techniques of multivariate probit regression is used to assess the
probability of participation of farmers in collective action for irrigation water
management. Followed by Heckman sample selection to measure intensity of
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participation in irrigation water management for those who have participated in the
multivariate probit model.
Participation in collective action for irrigation scheme was measured by labour
allocated towards main canal cleaning, contribution of funds for irrigation activities,
participation in water related meetings.
Intensity of participation measures the level of involvement or how actively a farmer is
participating in collective action. The person day labour spent on canal cleaning, the
amount of money contributed irrigation activities and how many meetings attend per
year will be used as a predicate variable to measure intensity.
The specification of a multivariate probit model is as follows
This multivariate probit model calculates the probability that farmers participate or
don’t participate given the dependent variables. It is an extension of the seemingly
unrelated regression with binary dependent variables following a multivariate normal
distribution using Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane recursive simulator (Gates, 2006)
.The responsive variables (Yim)*= Xim βˊm+ εim where Yim = 1 if farmer participates in
collective action and 0 if not where m=1,……, M with error that are correlated among
systems of equations (Green, 2012)
Where the independent variables for this model are
Xm, 1= constant,
Xh, 2= Dummy variable for Gender of household head, where male= 1 and female= 0
Xh, 3= Age of household head in years
Xh, 4= Household labour supply for irrigation activities: no of members between the age
of 15-64
Xh, 5= No of years spent on education by the household head
Xh, 6= Annual income of the household from irrigation in birr
Xh, 7= whether household owns a mobile phone, where yes= 1 and no= 0
Xh,8= Whether household owns a radio, where yes= 1 and no= 0
Xh,9= Whether household owns a Television, where yes= 1 and no= 0
Xf,10= Size of irrigated farm in hectares (hectare)
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Xf,11= Size of rain fed farm in hectares (hectare)
XInf,12= Distance to input market in walking minutes
XInf,13= Distance to all weather road in walking minutes
XInf,14= Distance to crop selling market in walking minutes
XIns,15= Extension contact in irrigation, where yes= 1 and no= 0
XIns,16= Extension contact in rained agriculture where yes= 1 and no= 0
XIns,17= Whether a household is a member of community based organizations, where
yes= 1 and no= 0
Xs,18= Whether the rainfall is adequate for the irrigation farmer (his or her perception),
where yes= 1 and no= 0
Xs,19= Age of irrigation dam
Xs,20= Dummy variable for position of block, where mid is used as a bench mark for
head and tail
Xh, 2 to Xh, 9 are household level variables, Xf, 10 and Xf, 11 are farm level variables, Xinf,
12 to Xinf, 14 are infrastructure level variables, , Xins, 15 to Xins, 17 are institutional level
variables , Xs, 18 and Xs, 20 are Scheme level variable
3.4.1 Hypothesis
3.4.1.1 Household level variables
Dummy variable for gender of household head, where male= 1 and female= 0 is
determined by the model because it is determined by the social characteristics of the
area (Deribe, 2008). Age of household head in years will have a sign that is determined
by the model which can push the household to participate and not participate.
Participate because they have more experience in farming and have better social ties
than younger household heads. On the other hand, due to peer pressure and expectation
of higher cooperation among their elders for an acceptance of their role as a household
head in the village by younger household heads will participate (Muchara, et al.,
2014).Household family labour supply will have a positive relationship because it
increases their productivity and reduce their cost. (Deribe, 2008) and (Muchara, et al.,
2014).Number of years spent on education by the household head will have a positive
effect because as the number of years in education increases the household would be
more likely to participate in collective action. (Deribe, 2008) and (Muchara, et al.,
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2014). Annual income of household from irrigation in birr will be determined by the
model because if agriculture is the main source of livelihood it would make it more
likely to participate but if they have other source of income it will not be likely
(Muchara, et al., 2014).Whether household owns a mobile phone, where yes= 1 and
no= 0 if a household owns a mobile phone it has a positive effect because this will
reduce the cost of communication for collective action and will make farmers more
alert in participation (Qaim & Fischer, 2012). Whether household owns Radio, where
yes= 1 and no= 0 this determined by the model because of use on individuals purpose
if a household uses his radio to obtain information it will have a positive effect on
participation in collective action but for entertainment purpose it will be negative.
Whether household owns Television, where yes= 1 and no= 0 the same proposition
goes for ownership of television as outlined above for ownership of radio.
3.4.1.2 Farm level variables
Size of irrigation farm in hectare (timad) can be a proxy for wealth (Araral, 2009).
This variable is expected to have a positive impact because farmers will be participating
since they want to ensure their share of water is distributed to them without any
cutbacks. Size of rained farm in hectares (Timad) is a variable that is expected to affect
the probability of participation negatively making a farmer less likely in participation
of collective action for irrigation activities.
3.4.1.3 Infrastructure level variables
Distance to input market in walking minutes is going to be determined by the model
on how it affects the response variable. Distance to all weather road how this variable
is going to affect the response variable will be determined by the model. Distance to
crop selling market will affect the response variable positively as they are nearer to the
market (Araral, 2009) and (Deribe, 2008).
3.4.1.4 Institutional level variables
Extension contact in irrigation will affect the probability of participation and will be
determined by the model. Extension contact in rainfed agriculture will affect the
probability of participation and will be determined by the model. Whether a
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household is a member in community based organizations, where yes= 1 and no= 0,
will have a positive effect because it can enhance social norms and characters of how
the farmers operate based on their community improving collective action (Deribe,
2008).
3.4.1.5 Scheme level variables
Whether the rainfall is adequate for the irrigation farmer (his or her perception),
where yes= 1 and no= 0 will be determined by the model. (Deribe, 2008). Age of
irrigation dam will have a positive effect because the higher age of the dam the more
developed and organized farmers will be to participate in collective action. Dummy
variable for position of block, where Head and tail are included in the model where
mid is a benchmark how this variable affects independent variable is going to be
determined by the model (Muchara, et al., 2014).
3.5 Econometric analysis
Following a Multivariate probit regression on did you clean dams in 2007, did you
contribute funds for irrigation activities and attending meetings by water user
association, Stata 13 was used to analyze every participation variable where
participation was 1 and non-participation was 0 in the first stage. In the second stage
using Heckman two stage sample selection model was used to check for existing of
selection bias and to measure intensity of participation if there is selection bias.
Adjusted model by Heckman was used to measure intensity of participation where the
dependent variables for measuring intensity are how many person days a farmer cleaned
the dam, how much fund a farmer contributed for irrigation activities and how many
WUA yearly meetings were attended by the irrigation farmer.
3.5.1 Why Multivariate probit model?
Participation in collective action is a combination of factors that are considered as
dependent variables in this study.  This dependant variables are individual decisions
made by irrigation farmers with relationship among one another. A decision to
contribute funds for irrigation maintenance activities is interrelated with decision to
clean dam. Interdependency of decision in participating in one activity and not
participating in the other is at hand due to rational behaviour among participants. The
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value given to personal gain is inconceivable compared to social welfare. Hence
farmer’s participation behave to maximize personal gain. (Muchara, et al., 2014).
A user written Stata command mvprobit by (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003) was used.
This command is multivariate probit model that follows the structure of a simulated
maximum likelihood estimation using a GHK recursive conditional simulator
developed by (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). When the number of random draws tends
to infinity the more equivalent the simulated maximum likelihood will be to maximum
likelihood estimation. The number of draws were increased to 15 than the default 5
(ibid).
Table 3.5.1 Results of the Multivariate probit model for cleaning of dams
Dam cleaning in 2007 Coefficients Robust
Standard error
P value
Own mobile phone -.0196551 .278647 0.944
Own radio -.2435572 .3392991 0.473
Own Television -.2921425 .3686069 0.428
Age of Household head .0091348 .009604 0.342
Education of household head .0523275 .0457438 0.253
Labour force in the household .2721043 .1018582 0.008***
Distance to all weather road .0116634 .0056932 0.040**
Size of irrigation farm -.6323973 1.925461 0.743
Size rainfed farm .99506 1.576252 0.528




Distance to input market -.0020036 .0064803 0.757
Distance to selling market .0007345 .0027054 0.786
Household head Sex -.2902285 .3073629 0.345
Extension contact in rainfed
farming
.3064853 .5960536 0.607
Extension contact in irrigation
farming
.1931537 .5793612 0.739
Head ender dummy .7497844 .3593449 0.037**
Mid ender dummy .5670992 .3960845 0.152
Age of Dam .059651 .0339268 0.079*
Perception of rainfall adequacy .7680998 .3238237 0.018**
Constant -2.774607 .9132067 0.002**
Number of observation’s= 239 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000





3.5.1.1 Results of determinants in collective action for cleaning of dam
The decision to participation in cleaning of dams was found to be significantly affected
by labour force of the household, income earned from irrigation, distance to all weather
road, membership in community organization, head ender dummy, age of dam,
perception of rainfall adequacy out of 20 independent variables.
Labour force: - The more labour force available in a household the higher the
predicted probability of participating in cleaning of dam. This shows the more the
labour force the higher the labour presented to clean dam. Labour force was found to
be statistically significant (P<0.01).
Distance to all weather road: - This has a positive effect on predicated probability of
participation in cleaning of dam being statically significant (P<0.05). The longer a
respondent takes to reach all weather road the higher the probability of participation
was a surprising result.
Income earned from irrigation: - This has a positive effect on predicated probability
participation in cleaning of dam. This shows a respondent earning more income from
irrigation will have a higher probability of cleaning with significance level (P<0.01).
Income earned from irrigation was determined by the model in the hypothesis which
affects participation positively hence 94.2% of the respondents had crop farming as
their main occupation.
Membership in community organization: - This has a positive effect on predicated
probability participation in cleaning of dam with significance level (P<0.05).
Membership in community based organization promotes social capital which is a vital
element in participation. A respondent who is a member of community organization
has a more probability of participating in cleaning of dam.
Head ender dummy: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.05).
Head ender farmer significantly has a higher probability of participation in cleaning of
dam than tail ender farmers. Because the closer a farmer is the less the cost of travel to
clean the dam.
Age of Dam: - This has a positive effect on predicated probability of participation in
cleaning of dam with significance level (P<0.1). The higher age of dam shows more
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organized and developed the local water user association. The older the dam is the
higher the probability of farmer cleaning the dam.
Perception of rainfall adequacy: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.05). If a respondent perceive rainfall is adequate, the more water available for
rainfed farm hence to have a higher production of crops on irrigation farm the same
respondent will have higher predicted probability of participation in cleaning.
Table 3.5.1.2 Results of the Multivariate probit model for contribution of funds





Own mobile phone .3641792 .2928257 0.214
Own radio -1.03722 .336871 0.002***
Own Television -1.179999 .3744703 0.002***
Age of Household head .0278259 .0102905 0.007***
Education of household head .1025706 .051549 0.047**
Labour force in the household .2691476 .0914337 0.003***
Distance to all weather road .0694708 .0159944 0.000***
Size of irrigation farm 5.188326 2.427177 0.033**
Size rainfed farm -6.156575 1.526983 0.000***




Distance to input market -.006127 .0070674 0.386
Distance to selling market -.0002214 .0020065 0.912
Household head Sex .069757 .2836954 0.806
Extension contact in rainfed
farming
.695014 .3815502 0.069*
Extension contact in irrigation
farming
-.1774156 .3861917 0.646
Head ender dummy -.5545486 .3629627 0.127
Mid ender dummy -.7206409 .3747694 0.054*
Age of Dam .2795042 .0602501 0.000***
Perception of rainfall adequacy 1.359854 .4146796 0.001***
Constant -6.356494 1.444584 0.000***
Number of observation’s= 239 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000





3.5.1.2 Results of determinants in collective action for contribution of
fund
The decision to contribute funds for irrigation activities was found to be significantly
affected by 14 variables out of 20 explanatory variables.
Ownership of radio: - This has a negative effect with significance level (P<0.01),
ownership of radio will decrease the probability of a farmer in contributing funds for
irrigation activities. This is due to only 17% of the farmers have radio reverse results
than originally excepted.
Ownership of television: - This had unforeseen results affecting contribution
negatively with significance level (P<0.01), ownership of television will decrease the
probability of a farmer in contributing funds for irrigation activities. This could be as
a result of low ownership of television would reduce access to information and
knowledge. 11.67% ownership, television in the sample having an adverse effect than
expected.
Age of household head: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01).
The older a household head is the higher the probability of contribution of funds to
irrigation activities. Older household head will have more experience in irrigation
farming and better social ties
Education of household head: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.05). The more educated house hold head is the higher the probability of
contribution of funds to irrigation activities. Household head education is essential to
comprehend various maintenance costs are required.
Labour force of the household: - This has a positive effect with a significance level
(P<0.01). The higher the Labour force the higher predicated probability of
contribution of funds in irrigation activities. The more the Labour force the higher the
earning capacity of the household.
Distance to all weather road: - This has a positive effect with a significance level
(P<0.01).
The longer a farmer has to travel to reach all weather road the higher predicated
probability of contribution of funds in irrigation activities. The collective effect of
being a remote area demands more transportation cost to replace irrigation facilities.
The longer it takes to reach all weather road the more cost incurred on a farmer
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implying households have to travel by foot using shortcuts to reach all weather road
leaving fund for contribution to be higher.
Membership in community organization: - This has a positive effect with a
significance level (P<0.01).Being a member of community organization will increase
the probability of contribution of funds significantly as a result of social ties imposing
indirect reminder and ability to be better household in the community.
Size of irrigation farm: - This has a positive effect with a significance level (P<0.05).
The higher the size of irrigation farm, the more predicted probability of contribution
funds. Due to the higher the size of land the more a household is required and able to
contribute funds.
Income earned from irrigation: - This has a positive effect with significant level
(P<0.05). The higher the income, the more the predicted probability of fund
contribution. The more income earned from irrigation farming the more time spent
working on it.
Size of rainfed farm: - This has a negative effect with significant level(P<0.01).The
amount of time spent on irrigation farm and rainfed farm depends on its size if a
household has larger rainfed farm the higher the amount of time spent on working on
the farm will lead to lower contribution of funds for irrigation farm.
Extension contact in rainfed farming: - This has a positive effect with significance
level (P<0.1). Farmers who take rainfed agriculture training will have a higher
predicted probability of contribution of funds. Rainfed agriculture training is similar
to irrigation trainings improving yield hence more fund available
Mid ender dummy: - This has a negative effect with significance level (P<0.1). Mid
ender farmer significantly has a lower probability of contributing of funds for irrigation
activities than tail ender farmers. The geographical advantage a mid-ender has will
give it closer access but tail enders had to contribute funds for stable water flow.
Age of dam: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01). Age of dam
shows the strength and the development of irrigation scheme beneficiaries as the years
go by affecting contribution positively.
Perception of rainfall adequacy: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.01). If a respondent perceive rainfall is adequacy the more water available for
rainfed farm hence to have a higher production of crops on irrigation farm the same
respondent will contribute more fund.
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Table 3.5.1.3 Results of the Multivariate probit model for Attending of meetings






Own mobile phone .1586323 .2821909 0.574
Own radio -.0569252 .3525448 0.872
Own Television -.836876 .3765436 0.026**
Age of Household head .0015332 .0093239 0.869
Education of household head -.0139591 .0426344 0.743
Labour force in the household .2752562 .1068896 0.010**
Distance to all weather road .0219612 .0075419 0.004***
Size of irrigation farm .2910206 1.790039 0.871
Size rainfed farm .9795684 1.473011 0.506




Distance to input market .0161603 .0133286 0.225
Distance to selling market -.0018865 .0022764 0.407
Household head Sex -.0861668 .351788 0.807
Head ender dummy -.2266441 .3500804 0.517
Mid ender dummy -.4550953 .3609438 0.207
Age of Dam .1657288 .0436386 0.000***
Perception of rainfall adequacy .6439849 .3319098 0.052*
Constant -2.416803 .9697454 0.013**
/atrho21 1.030145 .3487111 0.003***
/atrho31 1.100745 .4139921 0.008***
/atrho32 1.403662 .2883021 0.000***
rho21 .7739664 .1398248 0.000***
rho31 .8007666 .1485291 0.000***
rho32 .8861406 .0619143 0.000***
Number of observation’s= 239 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000




The multivariate model of participation for collective action can be acceptable because
the error correlation (rhoij) and the covariance matrix (/atrhoij) are significant. The
decision to participation in cleaning of dams was found to be significantly affected by
labour force of the household, income earned from irrigation, membership in
community organization out of 20 independent variables.
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3.5.1.3 Results of determinants in collective action for attending
meetings
The Decision to attend water related meetings held by water user association is
significantly affected by ownership of television, labour force of household, distance
to all weather road, income from irrigation, membership in community organization,
age of dam and perception of rainfall adequacy. Out of the 20 explanatory variables
extension contact in irrigation farming and rainfed farming were dropped out because
they perfectly predict attendance in meeting. Household are organized in farmers
training centres to attend meetings held by water user association as well as extension
training programs.
Ownership of television: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.05).
This can be explained by the same logic as explained above on how it affects
attendance of meetings negatively.
Labour force of the household: - Labour force has a positive effect with significance
level (P<0.05). The higher the labour force, the higher the predicted probability of
attending a meeting because household can be represented on his/her behalf on
meetings by family members when he/she can’t make it.
Distance to all weather road: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.01). The longer it take to reach all weather road the higher the predicted
probability of attending meetings. A farmer who is in remote area would attend
meetings more regularly, with fear of repercussion from decided conclusions of
meetings which would be higher on him/her.
Income from irrigation: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01).
Households earning more income from irrigation would have to participate in meetings
to discuss on all issues that would affect their irrigation farm.
Membership in community organization: - This has a positive effect with
significance level (P<0.1).Being a member of community organization will increase
the predicted probability of attending meetings. Membership in community
organization creates social ties among farmers.
Age of dam: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01). As Age of
dam increase farmer will have higher predicted probability of attending meetings. The
older the age of dam affects more farmers are more trained and organized from their
experiences.
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Ownership of radio and television doesn’t only show access to information but also
can be a sign of wealth. Hence a farmer likelihood of participation in attending
meetings is be affected by ownership of television. Also a farmer likelihood of
participation in contribution of funds is be affected by both ownership of television
and radio.
3.5.2 Heckman sample selection model
To analyze the individual intensity of participation, econometric model specifically
regression model with sample selection was used. Given that the household participates
in water management activities. We can measure their intensities.
Running a seemingly unrelated regression as a second stage would have been
acceptable if the respondents that participated in collective action were selected at
random but respondents are self-selected non-randomly. Non random selection leads
to incidental truncation of sample hence sample selection bias occurs. Heckman
sample selection model was implemented to correct for sample selection (Heckman,
1979).
This probit model calculates the probability that farmers participate or don’t
participate with the responsive variable yi
yi*= xi'γ+ɛi, yi= 1 if yi*>0
Prob(yi= 1 | xi ) = Φ(xiγ) where yi= 1 if farmer participates in collective action and
0 if not, xi is a vector of independent variables, γ is a vector of unknown variables and
Φ is cumulative distribution function. (Green, 2012) Estimation of the model will
produce results that can be used to predict participation probability of each farmer.
In the second stage self-selection for those who participated has to be corrected. The
intensity equation may be specified as follows
I*=Xβ' + ui
Where I* symbolizes intensity of participation, which can’t be observed if the farmer
doesn’t participate. The conditional expectation of intensity given the farmer
participates is
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E [I|X, yi=1] = Xβ+ E [ui|X, yi=1]
Based on the assumption that error terms (ɛi ui) ~ jointly normal [0, 0, 1, σu, ρ] it
follows
E [I|X, yi=1] = Xβ+ρσuλ(xiγ)
Where ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of tendency to participate
in collective action, σu is the standard deviation of ui and λ is the inverse Mill’s ratio
evaluated at xiγ. Inverse Mill’s is a ratio of probability density function over the
cumulative density function The above illustration shows that sample selection is
considered as omission of variable bias where (ui | ɛi > -xiγ) is the omitted variable. An
estimate of the omitted variable would solve the sample selection bias.
After running Heckman sample selection on three univariate probit regression models
for each dependant variable outlined on the multivariate probit model. It was found out
that Inverse mills ratio was significant for cleaning of dams and attending meetings
showing selection bias is serious problem, while it was found to be insignificant for
contribution of funds. Following multivariate probit model Heckman sample selection
would be applied on each dependant variables that explains intensity of participation
in collective action. Heckman was applied on how many days cleaned, how much
funds contributed and how many days attended.
3.5.2.1 Results of intensity of participation for how many person day
cleaned
Ownership of mobile phone: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.05). This shows a respondent having participated in cleaning of dams will be
more intensive with ownership of mobile phone. Mobile phone is a source of
information with two direction communication enabling an owner to obtain as much
information as needed. For ownership of mobile phone by a farmer he/she would spend
3.3 person days more in cleaning of dams.
Ownership of radio: - This has a negative effect with significance level (P<0.1). A
respondent ownership of radio is not only for the purpose of information but also
entertainment. As shown in the descriptive analysis low ownership among respondents
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will have the reverse effect than expected. Farmer who owns a radio would decrease
2.18 person days of cleaning than who doesn’t
Age of household head: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.05).
As a household head is older the more experience attained will increase person days
spent cleaning irrigation dam. As the age of household head increases he/she would
clean 0.08 days more than younger household.
Education of household head: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.1).the more educated a household head is the higher the person days spent on
cleaning the dam. This is straight forward explanation. The higher the grade of class
attended by a household head, he/she would clean 0.29 more days than the lower grade
attended household.
Size of irrigation farm: - This has a negative effect with significance level (P<0.01).
A farmer would be less intensive in cleaning irrigation dam as the higher the size of
irrigation farm owned. The higher the size of irrigation farm the more he/she has to
work on it leaving person days for cleaning limited. The higher the hectare of irrigation
farm, farmers person day cleaned will reduce by 27.
Age of dam: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01). A farmer
will be more experienced and trained with higher age of dam explaining the positive
relationship observed. The older the dam 0.6 more days spent cleaning by farmer.
Perception of rainfall adequacy: - This has a negative effect with significance level
(P<0.05). If a farmer perceives the rainfall is adequate the more water available
reducing intensity in cleaning of dam. If a farmer perceives rainfall will be adequate
he/she would have 2 less person days spent on cleaning.
Lambda: - This has a positive effect with significant level (P<0.01). Lambda shows
there is a problem selection bias that can’t be ignored. The positive sign shows there
are unobserved factors affecting how many person days a farmer cleaned positively.
The mean VIF (variance inflation factor) for this model is 1.94 showing very low
correlation.
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Table 3.5.2.1 Heckman model for how many days cleaned (regression model with
sample selection)
Number of observation = 239       Censored observation = 38
Uncensored observation   = 201    Prob > chi2 =0.0000 Wald chi2(19) =199.32




3.5.2.2 Results of intensity of participation for how much money
contributed
Ownership of mobile phone: - This has a negative effect with significance level
(P<0.05). Ownership of mobile phone would decrease the fund contributed for
irrigation activities by a household with ownership of mobile phone comes a variable
cost. A farmer who owns mobile phone would contribute 7 ETB less than a farmer
who doesn’t






Own mobile phone^ 3.375633 1.057505 0.001*** 1.65
Own radio^ -2.183491 1.185452 0.065* 1.22
Own Television^ -.3473404 1.556219 0.823 1.30
Age of Household head .081632 .0366166 0.026** 1.44
Education of household head .2941174 .1686386 0.081* 1.68
Labour force in the household .0090494 .3078054 0.977 1.53
Distance to all weather road -.0220815 .0160792 0.170 1.98
Size of irrigation farm -27.28479 7.944676 0.001*** 3.16
Size rainfed farm 1.903711 6.001851 0.751 2.21
Income from irrigation .0000743 .0001005 0.460 1.50
Distance to input market -.0009512 .0288267 0.974 1.23
Distance to selling market -.0084299 .008627 0.328 1.94
Household head Sex^ -1.283588 1.066363 0.229 1.34








Head ender dummy^ .4494068 1.24977 0.719 2.17
Mid ender dummy^ -1.951489 1.215658 0.108 1.85
Age of Dam .6030801 .1019723 0.000*** 2.68
Perception of rainfall adequacy^ -2.248748 1.047702 0.032** 1.60
Lambda 3.759433 2.00891 0.061* 2.01
Constant 2.593317 3.399829 0.446
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Distance to all weather road: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.1). The longer it take to reach all weather road the higher the contribution of funds
by a famer. Each farmer would have to share the cost of irrigation facilities. A famer
who travels more to reach all weather road would contribute 8 cents more than a farmer
closer to all weather road.
Size of irrigation farm: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01).
The higher the size of irrigation farm the more amount contributed. Farmer with larger
irrigation farm would have to contribute more money to finance the cost of irrigation
facilities. The more water a farmer uses the higher he/she has to contribute. A farmer
who has a larger irrigation farm would contribute 60 ETB more than with smaller
irrigation farm.
Distance to crop selling market: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.05). The longer it takes a farmer to reach crop selling market the more amount of
money contributed to irrigation activities. Since farming is the main source income for
a farmer a problem with water distribution with the dam would significantly reduce
his/her income. A farmer would set aside the amount needed to contribute and travel
by foot to crop selling market. A farmer who has to travel more to reach crop selling
market would contribute 5 cents than closer farmer.
Extension contact in irrigation farming: - This has a positive effect with significant
level (P<0.01). The more irrigation practices training will increase the know-how of
farmers with understanding of the various cost incurred a farmer will contribute more
money. A farmer who attended irrigation trainings would contribute 11 ETB more than
farmer who didn’t attend.
Household Head Sex: - This has a positive effect with significant level (P<0.1). Male
headed households would contribute more money than female headed households this
is because 52% of the female household heads are over the age of 50 and 47% divorced
showing very low income for female headed households. A male household head
would contribute 5 ETB than a female household head.
Head ender dummy: - This has a negative effect with significant level (P<0.05). Tail
ender farmers would contribute significantly more money than head ender farmers.
Tail ender farmers are the main fatalities if water flow reduces. A tail ender farmer
would contribute 7.4 ETB than a head end farmer.
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Mid ender dummy: - This has a negative effect with significant level (P<0.01). Tail
ender farmers would contribute significantly more money than mid ender farmers.
Based on the same logic will be the same given for head ender dummy above. A tail
end farmer would contribute 9 ETB more than a mid end farmer
Age of dam: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01). The older
the dam the more renovation required to keep flow of water along the farmer’s stable
demanding higher contribution of money by the farmers. The older the age of dam
2ETB more is contributed by farmers for renovation
Perception of rainfall adequacy: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.01).Positive perception of rainfall adequacy will increase the contribution of
money for irrigation activities. Hence rainfall is an important source of water for
irrigation if a farmer has positive perception he will contribute more money to facilitate
proper water distribution. Proper water distribution will reduce the possibility of
mismatch between timing of water allocation. If a farmer perceives rainfall is adequate
he/she would contribute 12.6 ETB for irrigation activities.
The mean VIF (variance inflation factor) for this model is 1.91 showing very low
correlation.
Table 3.5.2.2 Heckman model for how much funds contributed (regression model with
sample selection)







Own mobile phone -7.040193 2.876986 0.014*** 1.58
Own radio .8016917 3.363356 0.812 1.18
Own Television -5.820649 4.538732 0.200 1.41
Age of Household head -.0249297 .0994967 0.802 1.42
Education of household head -.3898859 .4701507 0.407 1.71
Labour force in the household .4623886 .8359677 0.580 1.49
Distance to all weather road .0886426 .0463931 0.056* 2.16
Size of irrigation farm 60.20232 17.61929 0.001*** 2.51
Size rainfed farm 11.37236 17.58442 0.518 2.26
Income from irrigation -.0001236 .00028 0.659 1.52
Distance to input market -.0555915 .0886282 0.530 1.22
Distance to selling market .0561572 .0235231 0.017** 1.94
Household head Sex 4.948673 2.929289 0.091* 1.31





Number of observation = 240 Censored observation = 35





3.5.2.3 Results of intensity of participation for how many meetings
attended
Size of irrigation farm: - This has a positive effect with significance level (P<0.01).
The higher the size of irrigation farm the more household would be attending meetings.
Large size of irrigation farm affects income earned making farmer attended meetings
as much as possible. The larger the size of an irrigation farm a famer, would participate
on 11 more meetings
Distance to input market: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.05).The longer it takes the farmer to reach input market the more regular a farmer
would attend meetings. The further an input market is the more cost spent traveling.
The more attentive a farmer is in meetings the more problems will be solved in
collective action. The better the local water user association the more income earned
by farmers. If a farmer is further from input market the farmer will be more likely to
attend 1 meeting per year.
Distance to crop selling market: - This has a positive effect with significance level
(P<0.05). The longer it takes a famer to reach crop selling market the higher attendance
in meetings. Following the same logic outlined above farmers would attend more
meetings the longer it takes them to reach crop selling market. If a farmer is further
from crop selling market the farmer will be more likely to attend at most 1 meeting per
year.




Head ender dummy -7.452146 3.238671 0.021** 1.92
Mid ender dummy -9.128276 3.262249 0.005*** 1.68
Age of Dam 2.135239 .2980153 0.000*** 3.01
Perception of rainfall adequacy 12.65465 2.864624 0.000*** 1.56
Lambda -5.776468 6.625773 0.383 2.21
Constant -16.27861 9.33328 0.081*
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Mid ender dummy: - This has a positive effect with significant level (P<0.05). Mid
ender farmers would significantly attend meetings more than tail ender farmers. This
is unexpected result.
Age of dam: - This has a positive effect with significant level (P<0.01). The older the
age of irrigation dam the more farmers attends meetings. The older the irrigation dam
the stronger the local water user association. The older the dam a farmer would
participate 5 meetings per year
Lambda: - This has a negative effect with significant level (P<0.05). Lambda is
statically significant implying there is selection bias in the model. The negative sign
shows there are unobserved variables that affect attending of meetings negatively.
The mean VIF (variance inflation factor) for this model is 1.91 showing very low
correlation.
Table 3.5.2.3 The Heckman model for how many meetings attended (regression model
with sample selection)






Own mobile phone -.8894139 .5474299 0.104 1.60
Own radio -.852685 .6214332 0.170 1.17
Own Television -.3260779 .8279213 0.694 1.41
Age of Household head .0077842 .0189795 0.682 1.43
Education of household head .1179998 .0876036 0.178 1.60
Labour force in the household .1117922 .1755006 0.524 1.72
Distance to all weather road .0064682 .0096747 0.504 2.47
Size of irrigation farm 11.9711 4.003565 0.003*** 3.01
Size rainfed farm -5.271587 3.253133 0.105 2.28
Income from irrigation .0000153 .0000569 0.788 1.55
Distance to input market .030597 .0154223 0.047** 1.20
Distance to selling market .0104477 .0046594 0.025** 2.06
Household head Sex .6630517 .5677403 0.234 1.40
Head ender dummy -.7011374 .6101298 0.250 1.85
Mid ender dummy 1.345744 .6114175 0.028** 1.61
Age of Dam .2293629 .0644235 0.000*** 3.67
Perception of rainfall adequacy .4141074 .544594 0.447 1.51
Lambda -3.282997 1.6991 0.053** 2.76
Constant 1.974677 1.930123 0.306
Number of observation = 239       Censored observation = 25






Chapter 4 Conclusion and Recommendation
4.1 Conclusion
For a rainfed dependant farming patterns with rudimentary tools, irrigation is the better
option to improve productivity and livelihood. Small scale irrigation farming is
practiced in Ethiopia on large scale providing farmers higher income than before. Dam
irrigation projects are growing with small scale farming demanding local
administration or local water user association to improve and maintain collective action
among farmers.
What is collective action in irrigation water management? What determines farmers
participation in collective action in irrigation water management? After a farmer
participates in collective action what are the factors that affect intensity of
participation? All of the above questions have been addressed in this study.
Collective action is a combination of many activities that improve conditions of water
management across farmers. These activities definition differs according to locations
and schemes In this study collective action is represented by three variables, Cleaning
of Dam, Contribution of funds for irrigation activities and attending meetings issued
by local water user associations.
The importance of institutions was obtained from the results. Specifically informal
institutions affect collective action participation highly compared to formal
institutions. Farmers membership in community based organization represent informal
institutions which affected collective action positively. Membership in community
based organization can also show social ties among farmers. Hence even if more work
is done to promote formal institutions to encourage collective action more push should
be given to informal institutions. Working on social ties from informal institutions that
portray social ties is possible in the specific case with promotion of farmers to have
membership in community based organizations
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It was found out the labour force available in a house hold, Distance to all weather
road, Income earned from irrigation farming, membership in community organization,
Age of dam and perception of rainfall adequacy affect all the three dependant variable
positively. Distance to all weather road had an unexpected result showing the more a
farmer has to travel to reach all weather road the more likely he/she participate in
collective action. This results were given justification according to collective action
participation measurement variable considered. Perception of rainfall adequacy
affecting collective action positively was unexpected but it shows farmers work hard
to ensure collective action in irrigation water management. This variables should be
given emphasis hence the are the determinants of collective action
Participation in cleaning of dams was affected by labour force of household, distance
to all weather road, income from irrigation farming, membership of community based
organization, age of dam and perception of rainfall adequacy. Head ender farmer clean
dams more than tail end farmers this could be due to tail ender farmers are further away
from the dam and don’t participate in this cleaning rather their participate in
contribution of funds
Participation in contribution of funds was affected by age of household head, education
of household head, labour force of the household, size of irrigation farm, size of rained
farm, income from irrigation, membership is community based organization, extension
contact in rainfed farming, age of dam, and perception of rainfall adequacy. Tail ender
farmers contribute more funds than mid end farmers requiring attention to monitor
contribution made by mid end farmers. Ownership of radio and ownership of television
had an unanticipated results lowering likelihood of contribution if a farmer owns
Television or radio. It shows farmers who own television and radio use it mainly for
entertainment can be one explanation but this variables can also be a sign of wealth.
Attendance of meetings was affected by labour force of the household, income from
irrigation, distance to all weather road, membership is community based organization,
age of dam, and perception of rainfall adequacy. Any of the position of block variables
were not found to be significant. Television is used for entertainment for farmers who
own it reducing their attendance in meetings
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Intensity of collective action given farmer participates in collective action measuring
variables were affected by age of dam and size of irrigation farm. Age of dam affected
all positively while size of irrigation farm had a different sign based on which activity.
Once again we can find proof that the more years, experience the higher intensity of
participation in collective action.
Spending more person days for cleaning dam was affected by ownership of mobile
phone and radio, age of household head, education of household head, size of irrigation
dam, age of dam, perception of rainfall adequacy.  The majority of this variables are
household level variables. Hence we can conclude intensity in participation cleaning
is highly affected by each household level characters more so than institutions. This
evidence may hold true for other specific cases. While the importance of age of dam
should be highly acknowledged once internal institutions such as local water user
association grow and improve on ensuring intensive participation in collective action.
How much money contributed for irrigation activities is affected by ownership of
mobile phone, distance to all weather road, size of irrigation farm, distance to selling
market, extension contact in irrigation farming, age of dam and perception of rainfall
adequacy. Infrastructural level variables affects how much a farmer contributes more
than household level variables and scheme level variables show more effect here than
intensity spent for cleaning. Tail ender farmers (downstream farmers) were found to
contribute more money than head and mid ender farmers (upstream farmers).
Downstream farmers are more affected by infrastructural variables than upstream
farmers.
Attendance of meetings by WUA is found to be affected by size of irrigation dam,
distance to input market, distance to selling market and age of dam. Infrastructural
level variables are also seen to affect attendance in meetings held by WUA. It is
possible to conclude this variables are really important in affecting intensity more than
participation in collective action.
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Farmers irrigation farm position of block was expected to affect collective action
measuring variables largely but it only affected participation in cleaning and
contribution of funds.
In qualitative results it is clear that Dura was found to better site in practicing collective
action than Dibdebo and Laelay Logometi. Dura irrigation dam is older than any of the
others. Age of local water user association can be seen as an evidence for better
collective action.
4.2 Recommendations
 It has been found that majority of farmers income is dependent on agricultural
production. Irrigation is one component of agricultural production, improving
livelihood of farmers. Construction of small scale irrigation schemes will
improve the welfare of farmers.
 It has been found that membership in community organization significantly
affects farmers collective action. Hence encouraging expansion of community
organization would improve collective action.
 It has been found out no matter the distance to all weather road a farmer still
participates in collective action because irrigation farming amounts to majority
of his/her income. Constructing all weather road would further enhance
farmer’s willingness to participate in collective action.
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Annex
Multivariate model results for determinants of participation in collective action
_cons -2.774607 .9132067 -3.04 0.002 -4.56446 -.984755
perception_rainadeq .7680998 .3238237 2.37 0.018 .133417 1.402783
age_of_dam .059651 .0339268 1.76 0.079 -.0068443 .1261464
mid_d .5670992 .3960845 1.43 0.152 -.2092122 1.34341
head_d .7497844 .3593449 2.09 0.037 .0454812 1.454087
extension_irrigation .1931537 .5793612 0.33 0.739 -.9423733 1.328681
extension_rain .3064853 .5960536 0.51 0.607 -.8617584 1.474729
hhsex -.2902285 .3073629 -0.94 0.345 -.8926487 .3121916
distance_sellingmarket .0007345 .0027054 0.27 0.786 -.004568 .006037
distance_inputmarket -.0020036 .0064803 -0.31 0.757 -.0147047 .0106975
memb_communityorg .5788312 .2792184 2.07 0.038 .0315733 1.126089
income_irrgation .0005874 .0002144 2.74 0.006 .0001671 .0010076
size_rainfed_farm .99506 1.576252 0.63 0.528 -2.094338 4.084458
size_irrgation_farm -.6323973 1.925461 -0.33 0.743 -4.406232 3.141438
distance_awr .0116634 .0056932 2.05 0.040 .0005049 .0228218
laborforce .2721043 .1018582 2.67 0.008 .0724658 .4717427
education .0523275 .0457438 1.14 0.253 -.0373286 .1419837
age .0091348 .009604 0.95 0.342 -.0096887 .0279583
have_TV -.2921425 .3686069 -0.79 0.428 -1.014599 .4303136
have_radio -.2435572 .3392991 -0.72 0.473 -.9085713 .4214569
have_mobilephone -.0196551 .278647 -0.07 0.944 -.5657932 .526483
ddidu_clean
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Robust
Log pseudolikelihood = -144.79336 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Wald chi2(58) = 209.93
Multivariate probit (SML, # draws = 15) Number of obs = 240
Iteration 6: log pseudolikelihood = -144.79336
Iteration 5: log pseudolikelihood = -144.79336
Iteration 4: log pseudolikelihood = -144.79382
Iteration 3: log pseudolikelihood = -144.86233
Iteration 2: log pseudolikelihood = -145.94327
Iteration 1: log pseudolikelihood = -152.03889
Iteration 0: log pseudolikelihood = -173.4573
> age_of_dam perception_rainadeq), robust draws (15)
> memb_communityorg distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex head_d mid_d ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
> perception_rainadeq)(dmeting_ind = have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
> distance_sellingmarket hhsex extension_rain extension_irrigation head_d mid_d age_of_dam ///
> size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation memb_communityorg distance_inputmarket ///
> have_radio have_TV age education laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm ///
> extension_irrigation head_d mid_d age_of_dam perception_rainadeq)(Cont_fund = have_mobilephone ///
> memb_communityorg distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex extension_rain ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
. mvprobit (ddidu_clean = have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
63
chi2(3) = 57.3279 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Likelihood ratio test of rho21 = rho31 = rho32 = 0:
rho32 .8861406 .0619143 14.31 0.000 .6850669 .9617499
rho31 .8007666 .1485291 5.39 0.000 .2815233 .957266
rho21 .7739664 .1398248 5.54 0.000 .333431 .9370885
/atrho32 1.403662 .2883021 4.87 0.000 .8386002 1.968723
/atrho31 1.100745 .4139921 2.66 0.008 .2893358 1.912155
/atrho21 1.030145 .3487111 2.95 0.003 .3466835 1.713606
_cons -2.416803 .9697454 -2.49 0.013 -4.317469 -.5161367
perception_rainadeq .6439849 .3319098 1.94 0.052 -.0065465 1.294516
age_of_dam .1657288 .040396 4.10 0.000 .0865541 .2449034
mid_d -.4550953 .3609438 -1.26 0.207 -1.162532 .2523416
head_d -.2266441 .3500804 -0.65 0.517 -.912789 .4595008
hhsex -.0861668 .351788 -0.24 0.807 -.7756586 .603325
distance_sellingmarket -.0018865 .0022764 -0.83 0.407 -.0063482 .0025753
distance_inputmarket .0161603 .0133286 1.21 0.225 -.0099633 .0422838
memb_communityorg .5304036 .3162167 1.68 0.093 -.0893698 1.150177
income_irrgation .0001397 .0000761 1.84 0.066 -9.48e-06 .000289
size_rainfed_farm .9795684 1.473011 0.67 0.506 -1.907481 3.866618
size_irrgation_farm .2910206 1.790039 0.16 0.871 -3.217392 3.799433
distance_awr .0219612 .0075419 2.91 0.004 .0071793 .036743
laborforce .2752562 .1068896 2.58 0.010 .0657564 .484756
education -.0139591 .0426344 -0.33 0.743 -.097521 .0696028
age .0015332 .0093239 0.16 0.869 -.0167413 .0198077
have_TV -.836876 .3765436 -2.22 0.026 -1.574888 -.0988641
have_radio -.0569252 .3525448 -0.16 0.872 -.7479003 .6340499
have_mobilephone .1586323 .2821909 0.56 0.574 -.3944517 .7117163
dmeting_ind
_cons -6.356494 1.444584 -4.40 0.000 -9.187826 -3.525161
perception_rainadeq 1.359854 .4146796 3.28 0.001 .5470969 2.172611
age_of_dam .2795042 .0602501 4.64 0.000 .1614161 .3975922
mid_d -.7206409 .3747694 -1.92 0.054 -1.455176 .0138937
head_d -.5545486 .3629627 -1.53 0.127 -1.265943 .1568453
extension_irrigation -.1774156 .3861917 -0.46 0.646 -.9343374 .5795062
extension_rain .695014 .3815502 1.82 0.069 -.0528106 1.442839
hhsex .069757 .2836954 0.25 0.806 -.4862759 .6257898
distance_sellingmarket -.0002214 .0020065 -0.11 0.912 -.0041541 .0037113
distance_inputmarket -.006127 .0070674 -0.87 0.386 -.0199789 .0077249
memb_communityorg .9812963 .2932474 3.35 0.001 .4065419 1.556051
income_irrgation .0001949 .0000998 1.95 0.051 -6.90e-07 .0003905
size_rainfed_farm -6.156575 1.526983 -4.03 0.000 -9.149406 -3.163743
size_irrgation_farm 5.188326 2.427177 2.14 0.033 .4311468 9.945505
distance_awr .0694708 .0159944 4.34 0.000 .0381223 .1008192
laborforce .2691476 .0914337 2.94 0.003 .0899409 .4483544
education .1025706 .051549 1.99 0.047 .0015364 .2036049
age .0278259 .0102905 2.70 0.007 .0076569 .0479949
have_TV -1.179999 .3744703 -3.15 0.002 -1.913948 -.4460512
have_radio -1.03722 .336871 -3.08 0.002 -1.697475 -.3769644
have_mobilephone .3641792 .2928257 1.24 0.214 -.2097485 .938107
Cont_fund
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Heckman sample selection model for how many person days spent cleaning
_cons 2.593317 3.399829 0.76 0.446 -4.070225 9.25686
perception_rainadeq -2.248748 1.047702 -2.15 0.032 -4.302207 -.1952895
age_of_dam .6030801 .1019723 5.91 0.000 .4032181 .8029421
mid_d -1.951489 1.215658 -1.61 0.108 -4.334135 .4311566
head_d .4494068 1.24977 0.36 0.719 -2.000097 2.898911
extension_irrigation -2.192774 1.547416 -1.42 0.156 -5.225653 .8401048
extension_rain -1.765055 1.544218 -1.14 0.253 -4.791667 1.261557
hhsex -1.283588 1.066363 -1.20 0.229 -3.373621 .8064444
distance_sellingmarket -.0084299 .008627 -0.98 0.328 -.0253385 .0084787
distance_inputmarket -.0009512 .0288267 -0.03 0.974 -.0574506 .0555482
income_irrgation .0000743 .0001005 0.74 0.460 -.0001227 .0002714
size_rainfed_farm 1.903711 6.001851 0.32 0.751 -9.8597 13.66712
size_irrgation_farm -27.28479 7.944676 -3.43 0.001 -42.85607 -11.71351
distance_awr -.0220815 .0160792 -1.37 0.170 -.0535962 .0094333
laborforce .0090494 .3078054 0.03 0.977 -.5942381 .6123369
education .2941174 .1686386 1.74 0.081 -.0364083 .624643
age .081632 .0366166 2.23 0.026 .0098649 .1533991
have_TV -.3473404 1.556219 -0.22 0.823 -3.397474 2.702793
have_radio -2.183491 1.185452 -1.84 0.065 -4.506933 .1399514
have_mobilephone 3.375633 1.057505 3.19 0.001 1.302962 5.448305
how_many_pdc
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Wald chi2(19) = 199.32
Uncensored obs = 201
(regression model with sample selection) Censored obs = 38
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates Number of obs = 239
> extension_irrigation head_d mid_d age_of_dam perception_rainadeq) twostep
> memb_communityorg distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex extension_rain ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
> head_d mid_d age_of_dam perception_rainadeq, select (ddidu_clean= have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
> distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex extension_rain extension_irrigation ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///




lambda 3.759433 2.00891 1.87 0.061 -.177959 7.696824
mills
_cons -3.00534 1.137245 -2.64 0.008 -5.234298 -.7763815
perception_rainadeq .7645888 .4544168 1.68 0.092 -.1260519 1.655229
age_of_dam .0505378 .0459214 1.10 0.271 -.0394664 .140542
mid_d .6827659 .4404546 1.55 0.121 -.1805092 1.546041
head_d .7273813 .3677098 1.98 0.048 .0066832 1.448079
extension_irrigation .5030406 .6522251 0.77 0.441 -.7752971 1.781378
extension_rain .5115871 .6592185 0.78 0.438 -.7804575 1.803632
hhsex -.6827671 .3778268 -1.81 0.071 -1.423294 .0577599
distance_sellingmarket -.0012408 .0027076 -0.46 0.647 -.0065475 .0040659
distance_inputmarket -.0005716 .0113478 -0.05 0.960 -.0228128 .0216695
memb_communityorg .8435066 .381987 2.21 0.027 .0948258 1.592187
income_irrgation .0007265 .0002372 3.06 0.002 .0002616 .0011914
size_rainfed_farm .9626257 1.871079 0.51 0.607 -2.704623 4.629874
size_irrgation_farm -.9385664 1.849104 -0.51 0.612 -4.562744 2.685611
distance_awr .0117864 .0101126 1.17 0.244 -.008034 .0316067
laborforce .3511934 .1315871 2.67 0.008 .0932874 .6090994
education .0793588 .0558755 1.42 0.156 -.0301552 .1888728
age .0117523 .0111943 1.05 0.294 -.0101881 .0336926
have_TV -.4135086 .409598 -1.01 0.313 -1.216306 .3892888
have_radio -.2769498 .4009159 -0.69 0.490 -1.062731 .5088309

























Heckman sample selection model for how much money contributed for irrigation
activities
_cons -16.27861 9.33328 -1.74 0.081 -34.5715 2.014286
perception_rainadeq 12.65465 2.864624 4.42 0.000 7.040085 18.26921
age_of_dam 2.135239 .2980153 7.16 0.000 1.55114 2.719338
mid_d -9.128276 3.262249 -2.80 0.005 -15.52217 -2.734386
head_d -7.452146 3.238671 -2.30 0.021 -13.79982 -1.104469
extension_irrigation 11.10332 4.188984 2.65 0.008 2.893062 19.31358
extension_rain 5.50774 4.266128 1.29 0.197 -2.853717 13.8692
hhsex 4.948673 2.929289 1.69 0.091 -.7926271 10.68997
distance_sellingmarket .0561572 .0235231 2.39 0.017 .0100529 .1022616
distance_inputmarket -.0555915 .0886282 -0.63 0.530 -.2292996 .1181166
income_irrgation -.0001236 .00028 -0.44 0.659 -.0006723 .0004251
size_rainfed_farm 11.37236 17.58442 0.65 0.518 -23.09248 45.8372
size_irrgation_farm 60.20232 17.61929 3.42 0.001 25.66914 94.73549
distance_awr .0886426 .0463931 1.91 0.056 -.0022862 .1795714
laborforce .4623886 .8359677 0.55 0.580 -1.176078 2.100855
education -.3898859 .4701507 -0.83 0.407 -1.311364 .5315925
age -.0249297 .0994967 -0.25 0.802 -.2199397 .1700804
have_TV -5.820649 4.538732 -1.28 0.200 -14.7164 3.075102
have_radio .8016917 3.363356 0.24 0.812 -5.790365 7.393749
have_mobilephone -7.040193 2.876986 -2.45 0.014 -12.67898 -1.401405
cont_fund_in_birr
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Wald chi2(19) = 364.54
Uncensored obs = 205
(regression model with sample selection) Censored obs = 35
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates Number of obs = 240
> extension_irrigation head_d mid_d age_of_dam perception_rainadeq) twostep
> memb_communityorg distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex extension_rain ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
> extension_irrigation head_d mid_d age_of_dam perception_rainadeq, select (Cont_fund =have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
> distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex extension_rain ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
. heckman cont_fund_in_birr have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
sigma 16.377994
rho -0.35270
lambda -5.776468 6.625773 -0.87 0.383 -18.76275 7.20981
mills
_cons -5.80884 2.243403 -2.59 0.010 -10.20583 -1.411851
perception_rainadeq 1.35911 .4872213 2.79 0.005 .4041742 2.314047
age_of_dam .226604 .0935672 2.42 0.015 .0432157 .4099923
mid_d -.7769051 .4796743 -1.62 0.105 -1.717049 .1632392
head_d -.5142963 .4075686 -1.26 0.207 -1.313116 .2845234
extension_irrigation .093086 .6506166 0.14 0.886 -1.182099 1.368271
extension_rain .7080979 .6019133 1.18 0.239 -.4716304 1.887826
hhsex .0118875 .364473 0.03 0.974 -.7024665 .7262414
distance_sellingmarket -.0004391 .0029546 -0.15 0.882 -.0062299 .0053518
distance_inputmarket -.0091496 .0080999 -1.13 0.259 -.0250251 .006726
memb_communityorg 1.222581 .4142078 2.95 0.003 .4107489 2.034414
income_irrgation .0001387 .0001315 1.06 0.291 -.000119 .0003965
size_rainfed_farm -8.05382 2.135614 -3.77 0.000 -12.23955 -3.868092
size_irrgation_farm 9.779384 3.879417 2.52 0.012 2.175866 17.3829
distance_awr .0537004 .025272 2.12 0.034 .0041682 .1032326
laborforce .2964761 .1389356 2.13 0.033 .0241673 .5687849
education .1680333 .0632477 2.66 0.008 .04407 .2919966
age .0338079 .0128141 2.64 0.008 .0086927 .0589231
have_TV -1.422322 .4517482 -3.15 0.002 -2.307732 -.5369119
have_radio -1.066881 .4131441 -2.58 0.010 -1.876629 -.2571336


























Heckman sample selection model for how many meetings attended
_cons 1.974677 1.930123 1.02 0.306 -1.808295 5.757649
perception_rainadeq .4141074 .544594 0.76 0.447 -.6532772 1.481492
age_of_dam .2293629 .0644235 3.56 0.000 .1030953 .3556306
mid_d 1.345744 .6114175 2.20 0.028 .1473878 2.544101
head_d -.7011374 .6101298 -1.15 0.250 -1.89697 .4946951
hhsex .6630517 .5677403 1.17 0.243 -.4496989 1.775802
distance_sellingmarket .0104477 .0046594 2.24 0.025 .0013154 .01958
distance_inputmarket .0306758 .0154223 1.99 0.047 .0004487 .0609029
income_irrgation .0000153 .0000569 0.27 0.788 -.0000963 .0001269
size_rainfed_farm -5.271587 3.253133 -1.62 0.105 -11.64761 1.104437
size_irrgation_farm 11.9711 4.003565 2.99 0.003 4.124256 19.81794
distance_awr .0064682 .0096747 0.67 0.504 -.0124938 .0254302
laborforce .1117922 .1755006 0.64 0.524 -.2321828 .4557671
education .1179998 .0876036 1.35 0.178 -.0537002 .2896998
age .0077842 .0189795 0.41 0.682 -.0294149 .0449834
have_TV -.3260779 .8279213 -0.39 0.694 -1.948774 1.296618
have_radio -.852685 .6214332 -1.37 0.170 -2.070672 .3653017
have_mobilephone -.8894139 .5474299 -1.62 0.104 -1.962357 .1835291
meet_attended
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Wald chi2(17) = 114.16
Uncensored obs = 214
(regression model with sample selection) Censored obs = 25
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates Number of obs = 239
note: two-step estimate of rho = -1.225045 is being truncated to -1
> perception_rainadeq age_of_dam) twostep
> memb_communityorg distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex head_d mid_d ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
> perception_rainadeq, select (dmeting_ind =have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
> distance_inputmarket distance_sellingmarket hhsex head_d mid_d age_of_dam ///
> laborforce distance_awr size_irrgation_farm size_rainfed_farm income_irrgation ///
. heckman meet_attended have_mobilephone have_radio have_TV age education ///
sigma 3.2829974
rho -1.00000
lambda -3.282997 1.6991 -1.93 0.053 -6.613172 .0471771
mills
_cons -2.026471 1.177253 -1.72 0.085 -4.333845 .2809034
age_of_dam .1257236 .0478061 2.63 0.009 .0320254 .2194218
perception_rainadeq .3779425 .4231039 0.89 0.372 -.451326 1.207211
mid_d -.0063438 .4565894 -0.01 0.989 -.9012427 .8885551
head_d -.164324 .4077589 -0.40 0.687 -.9635167 .6348686
hhsex -.3783686 .3405661 -1.11 0.267 -1.045866 .2891287
distance_sellingmarket -.0025408 .0024487 -1.04 0.299 -.0073402 .0022585
distance_inputmarket .0031345 .0140605 0.22 0.824 -.0244236 .0306926
memb_communityorg .6717032 .3945828 1.70 0.089 -.1016649 1.445071
income_irrgation .0002517 .000156 1.61 0.107 -.0000541 .0005575
size_rainfed_farm 1.522477 1.888198 0.81 0.420 -2.178322 5.223277
size_irrgation_farm -.0125205 1.719566 -0.01 0.994 -3.382807 3.357766
distance_awr .0171104 .0107597 1.59 0.112 -.0039781 .038199
laborforce .3584933 .1288862 2.78 0.005 .105881 .6111057
education .0030434 .054617 0.06 0.956 -.104004 .1100908
age .0034185 .0108434 0.32 0.753 -.0178342 .0246712
have_TV -.9362437 .4311629 -2.17 0.030 -1.781308 -.09118
have_radio -.0572232 .4589191 -0.12 0.901 -.9566881 .8422416
























Household level questionnaire for the survey


































Codes for Table 1
Marital Status
1=Single 2=Married              3=Divorced                       4=Widowed/ Widower
Occupation
1 = Crop farming                       2 = Livestock & poultry keeping (incl. sales)         3 = Unpaid domestic help 4 = Trading in livestock and livestock products (not own)
5 = Trading in agricultural Products (excluding livestock!) (Not own produce)   6 = Salaried employee (e.g. civil servant, domestic work)
7 = Business – trade / services (non-agric.)                8 = Not working / unemployed 9 =Old/Retired              10 = Infant (<6 years)         11 = Student/ pupil
12 = other (specify)
2. Household Asset
Asset Did your household own the Asset in
the production season? (1=yes 2=no)
2.1

































3.1 Did you cultivate your farm in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) Yes Code _______
3.2 Do you have an irrigated farm? (Yes/no)Yes Code _______
3.3 Do you have a rained farm? (Yes/no) Yes Code _______
3.4 If yes to question 2 what is the distance of plot number 1 from homestead in walking minutes?
3.5 Do you spend more time farming on the irrigation farm or the rain fed farm?
3.6 Do you have access to all-weather road? (Yes/no) Yes Code _______How many minutes does it take you to reach the all-weather road?











Size of the irrigation





































Size of the rain
fed farm/ Plot
size ( Timad or
Kert)
3.18
If rented in, how
much paid? (Birr)
3.18




Shared in (%) of
production paid)
3.20







4.1 Do you own any livestock? (Yes/no)___________ Code___________
4.2 Do you own small ruminants (sheep, goat)? (Yes/no)___________ Code___________if yes how many
4.3 Do you own Cattle (Cows, Oxen)? (Yes/no) 3  Code___________ if yes how many
4.4 Distance to Livestock market in walking minutes?
5. Access to market

























Market Places  (% sold at each place)
Use code































Market places: FG=Farm-gate; MP= Market in (tabia); MOP= Market in other PA(tabia); DM= market at District capital;    MZ= Market at zonal capital; RM=
Market at Regional capital
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Type of buyers: FR=Farmer; AS=Assembler; WS=Wholesaler; RT=Retailer; PR=Processor; UC=Urban consumer; CP=Cooperative
6. Participation in agricultural extension and training programs for rainfed plot
Did any of household members participate in any agricultural extension training programs in 2007 E.C for rainfed farm? (Yes/no)___________ Code _______
If Yes complete the following table for any household member who participated in any agricultural extension training programs (including BOA, REST, other
NGO programs) in 2007 E.C.








7. Participation in agricultural extension and training programs for irrigated plot
Did any of household members participate in any agricultural extension training programs in 2007 E.C for irrigated plot? (Yes/no)___________ Code _______
If Yes complete the following table for any household member who has participated in any agricultural extension training programs (including BOA, REST,











8. Membership in organizations
Did any of household members belong to any local or external organizations or committees in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no)___________ Code _______
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If yes complete the following table for any household members who have belonged to any local or external organizations or committees. (Including tabia baito,
kushet baito, men’s association, women’s association, youth association, elders association, agricultural cadre, church association, water users group, edir group,
























1=tabia 2=Kushet              3= men’s association                      4= women’s association                   5= youth association 6= elders association
7= agricultural cadre          8=church association      9= water users group            10 = edir group                         11=input supply cooperative    12=marketing
cooperative                   13= savings (equb) group
9. Credit access (cash or kind) – formal sources (banks, cooperatives, BOA, REST, other programs) and informal sources (moneylenders, traders,
intermediaries, friends, relatives, others)
Credit Access
9.1 Did your household need credit during the 2007 production season? 1=yes  2=no Code: if no stop here
9.2 If yes, did you apply for credit 1=yes  2=no Code: If no stop here
9.3 If yes, did you receive credit 1=yes  2=no Code If yes fill in Table below
9.4 If you didn’t, why not













































Purpose of credit (9.6 & 9.7):  1= input purchase for field crop production 2= input purchase for vegetable production 3= input purchase for fruit production 4=
input purchase for dairy 5= input purchase for cattle fattening 6= input purchase for small ruminant production 7= input purchase for small ruminant fattening 8=
input purchase for apiculture 9= input purchase for poultry   10=input purchase for  fodder 11= to buy irrigation equipment 12= to buy food 13= for medication
14= for schooling 15= for trading 16=other (specify)
Source of credit (9.9): [1] Banks [2] Friends / relatives / neighbors [3] Buying traders   [4] Microfinance [5] Other (specify) 6= Cooperatives 7=NGO (specify)
8= Government office (e.g. agriculture office)
Who received credit (Code 9.14): 1 = Head only 2 = Spouse only 3 = Head and spouse 4= Male children only 5 = Female children only 6= Male and female
children 7= all household members 8=others (specify) 9=head and male child only 10=Spouse and female child only;
Level of satisfaction (Code 9.15): 1] Very Poor [2] Poor [3] Good [4] Very Good
10. Income and Saving
10.1 Did you earn income in the 2007 E.C production season? 1=yes  2=no Code If yes how much
10.2 Did you Consume all of your income earned in 2007 E.C? 1=yes  2=no Code If yes how much
10.3 How much income did you earn from irrigation farm (farms)?
10.4 Did you save certain portion of your income in 2007 E.C? 1=yes  2=no Code If no stop here if yes how much
10.5 Do you have a bank account? 1=yes  2=no Code If yes how much did you save in 2007 E.C
10.6 How much do you have saved in your bank account?
11. Participation variables
12.1, was there any canal/wells cleaning done in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________ Code__________ if no go to 12.5
12.2, in which scheme did the cleaning took place?
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12.3, did you contribute your labor for canal/wells cleaning in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) __________ Code__________
12.4, how many person day?
12.5, was there any canal/wells repairs done in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________ Code__________ if no go to 12.8
12.6, did you contribute your labor for canal/wells repairs in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) __________ Code__________
12.7, how many person day?
12.8, was there any contribution of funds for scheme management in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ______Code______ if no go to 12.11
12.9, did you contribute funds for scheme management in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________
12.10, if yes, how much money did you contribute?
12.11, did you contribute funds towards water user associations in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________ if no go to 12.13
12.12, if yes, how much money did you contribute monthly?
12.13, is there a meeting that is held by the water users association to discuss on issues about water?  (Yes/no) ______ Code _____
12.14, is this meeting based on a certain group of members or all the members individually?  (Yes/no) ______Code_______
12.15, if yes in how many of them do you participate?
12.16, how many meetings are held per month?
12.17, was there any unlawful use of water in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________Code ___________
12.18, did you observe the unlawful use of water? (Yes/no) ___________ Code ___________ if no go to the separate questions
12.19, did you report any unlawful use if water in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________Code ___________
12.20, how many times did you report unlawful use of water in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) Code ___________
13. Separate Questions

 Do you think the amount of rainfall is adequate for the farm? (Yes/no) ___________ Code ______
 Are you a part of an irrigation association in your irrigation farm area?  (Yes/no) ___________ Code ______ if yes how much irrigators
are there in that group? ___________
 Where you there during the construction of irrigation scheme? (Yes/no) ___________ Code ______
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 If yes what was the year?
 Did you come across water availability problems for irrigating your farm relating to excess water when not needed in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no)
___________ Code ______ Why was it______________________
 Did you come across water availability problems for irrigating your farm relating to less water than required in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no)
___________ Code ______ Why was it _____________ Who resolved the conflict and how ______________________
 Did you come across water availability problems for irrigating your farm relating to mismatch between timing of water allocation in 2007
E.C? (Yes/no) ___________ Code ______ Why was it______________________ Who resolved the conflict and how
______________________
 Did you come across water availability problems for irrigating your farm relating to in a Water related conflict in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no)
___________ Code ______ Why was it Water Security Problem  Who resolved the conflict and how ______________________
 Do you think the water distribution to your plot was adequate in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________ Code ___________
 Do you think the water distributed to your plot is fair in 2007 E.C? (Yes/no) ___________Code ___________
 Do you have extension contact in livestock? (Yes/no) ___________
 Have you ever obtained training from farmer training centers (Yes/no) ___________ if yes how many minutes is the distance to the farmer
training center?
